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for the degree of Master of Philosophy 
at The Chinese University of Hong Kong in June 2005 
In recent years, WLAN becomes a trend and Wi-Fi systems are widely 
adopted, from home networking to enterprise-based infrastructure network-
ing. The importance of WLAN grows up with its popularity. 
One major concern limiting the deployment of wireless LAN (WLAN) 
is security issues. WEP is the first standardized measure introduced to 
provide different information security services to WLANs. However, the 
fact that WEP has many design flaws has motivated the finalization of the 
amendatory standard IEEE 802.Hi in 2004 in order to provide a real secure 
wireless communications environment. 
In this thesis, we survey on security of WEP and IEEE 802.Hi standard 
by mainly focusing the authentication methods provided by the two stan-
dards, as well as other related background materials. A new identity-based 
IEEE 802.111 authentication protocol is proposed for WLAN in infrastruc-
ture mode to operate in enterprises. The protocol is based on Au and 
Wei's identity-based identification scheme, as well as other public-key and 
symmetric-key cryptographic techniques. We show that the proposed proto-
col fulfills various security requirements such as mutual authentication and 
session key derivation, and delivers desired properties to be used in a WLAN 
such as providing fast reconnect and delegation, overcoming the weaknesses 
of the WEP authentication and other 802.Hi authentication methods. 
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Wireless communication is essential in the modern world. When you listen 
to radio, watch TV or make a call with your mobile phone, you benefits from 
the wireless communication technology. Wireless technology is capable of 
reaching virtually every location on the face of the earth. Hundreds of mil-
lions of people exchange information every day using pagers, mobile phones, 
portable digital assistants (PDAs) and other wireless communication prod-
ucts. At the same time, not less number of people are enjoying their favorite 
radio, TV or even 3G broadcast programmes. With tremendous success of 
wireless telephony and broadcast services, it is hardly surprising that wire-
less communication is widely applied to the realm of personal and business 
computing. 
Demands on wireless network services rise continuously in these few 
years. Wireless networks provide great convenience to users. No longer 
bound by the harnesses of wired networks, an end user can forget about 
wire connection and directly enters a Local Area Network (LAN) through 
wireless connection after he enters the coverage of access points. Moreover, 
users can move around while staying connected so as to access online infor-
mation and communicate with other people. Besides convenience, wireless 
networks also reduce wire running cost as well as the fire hazard brought by 
wires. These factors has raised people interest on wireless LAN (WLAN) in 
a great extent. 
The advance on wireless technology and the drop in price has responded 
the demands on WLAN services positively. The very beginning official 
WLAN specifications - IEEE 802.11 only provides 2 Mbps transmission 
speed. Now we hardly find 802.11 products in computer shops just be-
cause they are too slow. New standards IEEE 802.11b, 802.11a and 802.llg 
provides 11, 54, 54 Mbps transmission speed respectively and they fulfill 
broadband Internet access environment in many developed cities. Future 
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standard 802.1 In, with, the multi-input-multi-output technique, will further 
push, the maximum bandwidth to more than 100 Mbps. On the other hand, 
the prices of WLAN products, such as access points, WLAN adapter cards 
and WLAN routers, has decreased to very competitive values. As a re-
sult, installation cost of an enterprise WLAN has also dropped. Due to the 
above reasons, together with the popularity of mobile laptop and PDAs, 
WLAN networking has become practical in both home networks and enter-
prise networks and thus it becomes much more popular. Nowadays, WLANs 
are widely installed at homes, in schools and companies. Adopting WLAN 
services is a tread. 
Due to the importance and popularity of WLANs, we must look at an-
other side of the coin - security. If you are the receiver, the broadcast 
capability in wireless communication may be very attractive on the first 
glance. However, this feature sometimes can be a major disadvantage. This 
is because anyone can easily sniff or even modify the data transmitted in 
air. You may consider an analogy that you have to send a mail to one of 
your friends. You type the mail by computer and put the mail into the 
mailbox of your friend. Physical boundary of wired networks is analogous 
to the lock of the mailbox. If the mailbox does not have a lock, everyone can 
access the mail without difficulties. You cannot make sure that the content 
of the mail is not exposed. Moreover, your friend cannot ensure the mail in 
his mailbox is really sent by you and without being edited. Undoubtedly, 
measures should be taken so as to maintain security of the mail, as well as 
data transmitted in WLANs. 
Security is a major concern in designing a WLAN due to the physical 
nature of wireless communication. To secure a WLAN, the solutions are 
encryption and authentication. In brief, encryption ensures that only the 
person knows the secret can obtain the original data. Authentication en-
sures that the entity communicated is a "good guy" or a "good device" 
(entity authentication) and the message received is a "good message" (mes-
sage authentication) from a good entity. In particular, entity authentication 
can be used to restrict access to WLANs to users with privilege, in order 
to control the access to sensitive or licensed resources and data available 
over the network, to avoid the extra cost of providing network resources to 
unauthorized users, or to prevent outsiders to launch attacks to the wired 
network directly. 
In order to provide security, IEEE 802.11 standard includes a proto-
col called Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). It aims to provide encryption 
and authentication to WLANs. However, a number of researches discovered 
that WEP is in fact not secure enough in different aspects [12, 6, 26, 60\ 
To provide real security as well as better scalability and flexibility, a new 
generation of security standard for WLANs - IEEE 802.Hi was introduced. 
The new standard specifies the whole security architecture and protocols or 
framework on various security aspects including encryption and authentica-
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tion. It is expected that WLAN products compatible with the new standard 
will gradually replace the old ones. 
1.2 The Problems 
Because of the popularity of computers and the Internet, computer and 
Internet security is widely concerned. Nowadays, the Internet offers a con-
venient way to access various services. Some of the services require tough 
security configuration, for example, online shopping, E-banking and private 
E-mail. Internet security is widely researched, and new technologies pro-
tecting our computers are invented continuously. However, while the priest 
climbs a post, the devil climbs ten. Viruses, hacking, phishing attack and 
much more are threatening our life. In order to secure our valuable Internet 
transactions, computer data and privacy, security is always worth studying. 
As discussed before, wireless technology becomes more important in to-
day networking and thus WLAN security is what we must pay attention 
on. In most cases, a WLAN, from a home network to a corporate WLAN 
involves at least one access point. This kind of WLANs is said to be run in 
infrastructure mode and its security even more significant. IEEE 802.Hi is 
the latest formal technical WLAN security standard. The draft of the IEEE 
802.111 was ratified on last year and thus it is a new standard with many 
spaces to expose and analyze. While specifying robust key management, 
message authentication and encryption schemes, IEEE 802.Hi allows flexible 
implementation on user authentication process. Constructing a new entity 
authentication protocol provides flexibility for deployment of WLANs. One 
can make the appropriate choice that will work best for a specific WLAN, 
according to the properties of different protocols. 
Flexibility on user authentication process allows many existing authen-
tication protocols to be applied to WLANs following 802.Hi security archi-
tecture. Examples of the protocols include TLS and Kerberos, and they are 
evaluated in following chapters. A number of new protocols are also pro-
posed such as LEAP and PEAP. All these protocols have different charac-
teristics and weaknesses. For instance, while symmetric-key based approach 
suffers from secret key management and distribution problem in large en-
terprises, a common public-key based authentication protocol TLS has lim-
itation that public key infrastructure (PKI) is required and its efficiency is 
quite unsatisfactory. Designing an authentication protocol overcoming most 
weaknesses in existing protocols, and fitting the WLAN environment and 
IEEE 802.Hi standard is a beneficial task. 
Identity-based (IDB) cryptography was proposed by Shamir [57] in 1984. 
In brief, it is a subset of public key cryptography, but unlike typical one, 
it changes the nature of obtaining public keys by constructing a one-to-one 
mapping between identities and public keys. It avoids the need of PKI and 
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simplifies key management because users can use E-mail addresses or net-
work access identifier (NAI) as their public keys. Therefore it is interesting 
to apply IDB cryptography to WLAN security. Lee et al. firstly mentioned 
the possibility to apply IDB cryptography in WLAN authentication process 
39]. However the protocol proposed by Lee et al. is not secure at all in the 
WLAN environment because it is unable to prevent replay attack and does 
not derive session keys. As a result, to develop a brand new secure IDB 
authentication scheme is of great benefit to WLAN security. 
1.3 My Contribution 
This thesis focuses on IEEE 802.11 WLAN or Wi-Fi system security. It 
describes basics of WLAN security and compares the old WLAN security 
standard WEP with the new IEEE 802.Hi standard. It also evaluates vari-
ous existing and proposed 802.Hi authentication protocol. We focus on user 
authentication rather than message authentication and thus unless explic-
itly specified, "authentication" appearing in the following chapters means 
entity authentication. 
We have designed a secure user authentication protocol under extensible 
authentication protocol (EAP) specification, which IEEE 802.Hi authenti-
cation process takes the advantage of. The proposed protocol suits in IEEE 
802.Hi compatible WLAN running in infrastructure mode and has the fol-
lowing properties: 
• Our solution is identity-based, based on Au and Wei's IDB identifica-
tion scheme. Users can gain WLANs access with their NAIs without 
involvement in PKI. This overcomes the weaknesses of using PKI (as 
discussed in Section 3.4) since IDB cryptography grealy reduces the 
need for and reliance on public key certificates and certification au-
thorities. 
• Our protocol basically consists of two parts. The first one is an au-
thentication protocol executed in the first join of a client, for authen-
ticating the client to the server and deriving session keys. Another is 
a lightweight protocol for fast reconnect, based on session information 
created during the first join. The fast reconnect feature is useful in 
applications requiring seamless connections to networks. 
• Additional features are supported by the proposed scheme. For exam-
ple, delegation mechanism allows local users with appropriate right to 
offer temporary WLAN access to guests. Identity privacy hides the 
identities of the users accessing the network. 
The goal of the scheme is to provide a secure and efficient entity authen-
tication mechanism to WLANs in large enterprises, universities and other 
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organizations. The security and performance of the scheme are analyzed in 
details. 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: 
• Chapter 2 gives an overview on IEEE 802.11 WLAN. Moreover, it pro-
vides a short introduction to security in general and includes terminol-
ogy and taxonomy of different kinds of attacks and threats appearing 
in WLANs. More importantly, it describes several desired properties 
of WLAN authentication which the proposed protocol follows. 
• Chapter 3 introduces the concept of cryptography. It gives an overview 
of what are currently possible in the field. In specific, identity base 
cryptography is covered and its advantages are discussed. 
• Chapter 4 points out basic techniques to secure a WLAN. Moreover, 
details of the WEP protocol and its security flaws are studied. Weak-
nesses related to the authentication process in 802.11 are emphasized. 
Shortcomings of different security approaches are discussed so as to 
show the need of new WLAN security standard. 
• Chapter 5 describes the new WLAN security standard IEEE 802.Hi. 
It evaluates several EAP protocols applied to the 802.111 authentica-
tion framework and shows deficiency of each of them so that we can 
know the spaces for improvement. 
• Chapter 6 describes the proposed upper layer authentication protocol 
applied to IEEE 802.Hi. The details include the message exchange, 
the packet format and the mechanisms of addition features. Various 
security properties of the protocol are discussed according to the re-
quirements of WLAN environment including the EAP security claims 
in RFC3748 [2]. Performance of the protocol is also evaluated. 
• Chapter 7 offers a summary of this thesis and concludes on the future 
work on the proposed scheme. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 2 
Wireless LAN Security 
Model 
2.1 Preliminary Definitions on WLAN 
A few preliminary definitions on WLAN must be clarified before proceeding 
with the later-on sections: 
• A local area network (LAN) is a local computer network covering a 
local area, like a home, an office, an organization or an enterprise. 
• A wireless LAN (WLAN) is a type of LAN while data are transmitted 
in air through electromagnetic wave, instead of wire or optical fiber. 
Throughout the thesis, the term "WLAN" in fact refers to the wireless 
LAN following IEEE 802.11 specification [46； 
• IEEE 802.11 is a formal standard by IEEE Computer Society defining 
the physical (PHY) layer and media access control (MAC) layer of 
WLANs. IEEE 802.11 has several extensions on PHY, such as task 
group a, b and g. 
• Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity) originally is an informal name for the IEEE 
802.11 WLAN standard. It gives the Wi-Fi Alliance, an industry con-
sortium of 802.11 vendors, its name. A Wi-Fi system now is referred to 
a WLAN following the industrial standard and passing compatibility 
tests from the Wi-Fi Alliance. 
IEEE 802.11 defines two modes of operation: 
• In ad-hoc mode, mobile wireless stations (i.e. client devices) commu-
nicate with other stations directly. It is also referred as peer-to-peer 
mode or an Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS). 
6 
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• In infrastructure mode, mobile stations communicate with each other 
by first going through an access point (AP). An AP also acts as a 
bridge to a wired network, giving its clients access to resources on a 
larger LAN or the Internet through a gateway. 
The proposed protocol is operated on WLANs in infrastructure mode. 
In order to join a WLAN in infrastructure mode, a client station is mapped 
to an AP so that other stations on the wired and wireless networks have a 
means to contact the client station. This mapping is called association. An 
end station can only be associated with one AP at a time. Association is a 
three-state process and the three states are: 
1. unauthenticated and unassociated 
2. authenticated and unassociated 
3. authenticated and associated 
Only associated stations can access the network. A client station first 
identifies and AP from the AP's Beacon frame or from response from the AP 
after the client sends a Probe frame. Then authentication which is described 
in Section 4.2.1 is executed. Only authenticated stations can associate to 
the AP in legitimate ways. 
2.2 Security Model 
2.2.1 Security Attributes 
To be able to classify the different security needs of the applications of 
WLANs, the following attributes needs to be considered. 
Confidentiality Confidentiality is the process of keeping the information 
sent unreadable to unauthorized readers. One way to reach confi-
dentiality is the use of encryption, which is a process of combining a 
piece of data (plaintext) and a key to produce random-looking output 
(ciphertext). 
Authentication The term authentication is used at different levels in secu-
rity protocols. The first one is entity authentication and the second is 
message authentication. The former is also called identification, and it 
refers to the process to prove a person whom you want to communicate 
with really has the identity he claims. The latter is the process to prove 
a message is really sent by the sender you want to communicate with 
and it is not altered. Throughout our thesis, the term authentication 
represents entity authentication, unless explicitly specified. 
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Authorization Authorization is the process to decide whether to grant 
access to a party whose identity is proved after authentication. 
Access control Access control is a much more general way of talking about 
controlling access to a resource. Access is granted depending on spe-
cific rules and access control lists. 
Accounting Accounting is the process to measure the resource a user con-
sumes during access after authorization. Often, the combination of 
authentication, authorization and accounting is referred as AAA. 
Availability Availability means whether an application, a service, a client 
station is available and not blocked by attackers. 
Integrity Integrity is the ability of the secure system to guarantee that the 
received message is in fact the real one that has not been tampered 
with. 
Non-repudiation Non-Repudiation means the ability not to be able to 
deny sending a message, signing a signature and participating in an 
authentication process. 
Keys are used in many cryptographic algorithms, such as entity authenti-
cation, digital signature, encryption and keyed message authentication code. 
Different kinds of keys are described as follows. 
Private key Private key should be kept secret in order to secure the out-
puts of a cryptographic algorithm against any adversary. 
Public key In public-key cryptography, in contrast to the secret private 
key, a public key is published publicly for others to carry out appropri-
ate "inverse" algorithms such as encryption and signing ’ correspond-
ing to those controlled by the private key, for example, decryption and 
verification. 
Session key While private and public key are used in long term, a session 
key is used for encryption and data integrity for a short communication 
session. Often, a session key is generated by using key establishment 
algorithm. 
2.2.2 Security Threats in W L A N 
The main security issue with WLANs is that WLANs intentionally radiate 
data in air. Even worse, the radiation covers an area that exceed the limits 
of the area the organization physically controls in many cases. For instance, 
IEEE 802.11b radio waves at 2.4GHz easily penetrate building walls and 
are receivable from public area. While setting up rogue devices is much 
J 
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more difficult in wired LAN, if an attacker wants to carry out attacks to 
a WLAN in infrastructure mode, he can simply set up a hidden station or 
access point inside the organization or outside the organization but inside 
coverage of legitimate- wireless devices. The latter is indeed a piece of cake 
for any professional adversary. 
Inserting bad devices into a WLAN is only preparation of other more 
dangerous attacks. After so, an adversary can carry out attacks in different 
approaches, classified into four broad categories: snooping, modification, 
masquerading and denial of service (DoS). 
Snooping Snooping, or eavesdropping, is a kind of passive attack. It in-
volves gathering information from the data transmitted in air. The 
information is used in compromising the system or as preliminary for 
attacks in other categories. 
Modification An attacker may modify the contents of packets, insert pack-
ets to and delete from a WLAN. For modification and deletion, an 
attacker has to achieve using a physical way, such as sending inter-
fering radio signals. To modify a packet, the attacker has to act as a 
man-in-the-middle. He either does it on the fly, or store, modify and 
then send out the modified message. 
Masquerading Masquerading is the term used when an attacking WLAN 
device impersonates a valid device. The attacker attempts to fool the 
target network into validating it as an authorized device in order to 
gain access rights. 
DoS While the above three extend extra privilege to the attacker, a DoS 
attack causes damage to target by preventing operation of the network. 
DoS can be carried in physical level (PHY layer) and higher level 
(MAC layer, network layer or other upper layers). 
By carrying out such attacks, the attacker may achieve the following 
purposes: 
• To obtain free network resources such as Internet access 
• To capture sensitive or classified information 
• To insert information into an authentic transaction, without the knowl-
edge of legitimate users 
• To gain access to the corporate wired LAN through access of WLAN 
• To block out legitimate users from accessing the network 
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2.2.3 Attacks on Authentication Scheme 
The ultimate goal for an adversary to attack an entity authentication scheme 
is, if not to carry out a DoS attack, to impersonate a legitimate party of a 
network (prover) to the party checking the validity of the prover (verifier). 
An adversary can do the following specific attacks in order to achieve his 
goal. 
Replay attack An attacker replays the message from a single previous 
protocol execution, on the same or a different verifier. 
Interleaving attack An attacker selectively combines information from 
one or more previous or simultaneously ongoing protocol executions, 
including possible origination of one or more protocol executions by 
an adversary itself. 
Reflection attack An attacker sends back the received information from 
an ongoing protocol execution back to the originator. 
Forced delay An attacker relays a message at some later point of time 
after he intercepted it. 
Chosen-text attack An attacker makes use of the challenge-response mech-
anism of an authentication protocol in an attempt to extract informa-
tion about the long-term key of a legitimate user. This is because the 
attacker can choose the challenge during the protocol execution. 
2.2.4 Attacks on Keys 
If an adversary compromises a session key, confidentiality and data integrity 
of the corresponding session no longer exist. In order to obtain a session 
key, an adversary may carry out the following types of attack: 
Brute force attack An attacker tries every possible key until he finds a 
match. 
Dictionary attack An attacker guesses elements used to construct the key 
(e.g. letters and numbers if the key is a human-readable password) so 
as to reduce the key entropy. Then the attacker uses a huges database 
containing all the likely keys in order to find a match. 
Algorithmic attacks An attacker breaks the encryption algorithm by us-
ing information from the algorithm construction and ciphertexts, and 
possibly the corresponding plaintexts and other session keys. Besides 
the encryption algorithm, the attacker can also attempt to break the 
key exchange algorithm by using attack methods similar to those on 
authentication schemes. 
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2.3 Desired Properties of WLAN Authentication 
2.3.1 Security Requirements of W L A N Authentication 
After studying possible attacks from an adversary, we summarize the secu-
rity requirements of an authentication scheme for WLANs in the following 
Mutual authentication A mutual authentication is a bidirectional au-
thentication between two parties in a WLAN. If the WLAN is run in 
infrastructure mode, one of the parties will be a client station, while 
another will be a back-end authentication server. As setting up rogue 
devices in a WLAN is not a complex task, it is a must to validate the 
identity of another side of communication. Lack of mutual authenti-
cation allows an attacker to act as a man-in-the-middle between two 
parties and gather private information from their communication [44 • 
Authentication in each direction must be secure against impersonation 
by any adversary, including those carry out replay, interleaving and 
forced delay attacks. 
Dictionary attack resistance If human-readable password or passphrase 
is used during the authentication, it should be protected against dic-
tionary attack. 
Derivation of strong session keys Authentication alone is usually use-
less. Derivation of session keys allows the effect of authentication to be 
extended to the data communication session and thus prevents session 
hijacking [44]. Confidentiality and data integrity are protected by the 
session key and this allows the long-term private keys to be kept away 
from adversary. 
Key authentication If an authentication scheme involves derivation of 
session key, then it either provides implicit key authentication or ex-
plicit key authentication in both directions. Mutual implicit key au-
thentication means that both parties are assured that no other entity 
besides them can possibly ascertain the value of the secret session key. 
Mutual explicit key authentication means that both parties are assured 
that the opposite sides has actually computed the key. 
Resistance on key-compromise impersonation If long-term private key 
of an entity is compromised, an adversary can only impersonates that 
entity, but not the others. This can prevent attack from insiders. 
Identity privacy Identity privacy involves hiding of WLAN client's iden-
tity. Privacy is one of the human rights which desire to protect. In 
addition, identity privacy prevents an adversary from linking two au-
thentication executions and obtaining useful information from the re-
lationship of them. 
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Limited damage from DoS attacks A successful DoS attack should only 
lead to short blocking of a service. No long term state attributes, such 
as session keys, are affected by the DoS. 
2.3.2 Security Requirements of Session Keys 
As key derivation is an important requirement for WLAN authentication 
scheme, the session keys derived must have appropriate security. Security-
attributes of session keys are listed as follows: 
Key strength Entropy of the session key, namely key length, should be 
large enough so as to defend against brute force attack and dictionary 
attack. For session keys, a key establishment algorithm should depends 
on strong factors in order to generate keys with appropriate effective 
key strength. 
Known-key security Session key in each authentication execution should 
be unique and independently to others. Compromise of one session 
does not result in compromise of others from the same or a different 
client. This reduces damage of a successful attack. 
Forward secrecy If long-term private keys of one or more entities are com-
promised, the security of previously established session keys are not 
affected. This restricts the scope of damage. 
Unknown key-share resilience An entity cannot be coerced into sharing 
a session key with another entity without the former's knowledge. This 
prevents the entity from sending sensitive data to an attacker without 
awareness. 
Key control Neither entity is able to force the session key to a preselected 
value. This prevent either party from gaining benefits from forcing 
another to use a weak key. 
2.3.3 Other Desired Properties of W L A N Authentication 
Besides security, a WLAN authentication may provide other desired prop-
erties in order to provide convenience to users. Some examples are shown 
in the following. 
Fast reconnect In a WLAN, a client can roam from one access point to 
another. In order to maintain his connection to the network, he has to 
reconnect and execute authentication again. As some applications for 
WLAN, such as Voice over IP (VoIP), require seamless connections to 
the network, a fast reconnect mechanism is desirable. 
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Delegation In real life, guests of an organization may have to access the 
WLAN. In order to reduce the burden for the network administrator to 
manage temporary guest accounts, mechanism of delegating the right 
to allow guests to access the WLAN to other WLAN clients is a useful 
feature. 
Simple deployment A simple deployment of a WLAN system reduces the 
cost of installment of wireless devices and operation. 




3.1 Overview on Cryptography 
To understand what cryptography is, we may consider a simple cryptosys-
tem. Suppose there are two parties, Alice and Bob. Alice wants to send a 
message to Bob without an opponent, Oscar, being able to understand the 
actual message. The message have to travel in an insecure channel, such as 
a computer network. The original message that Alice wants to send is called 
the plaintext. Alice shifts each character of the plaintext a number of steps, 
with wraparound on the alphabet in order to obtain the ciphertext. For ex-
ample, the plaintext "abc" would be encrypted as the ciphertext " d e f . In 
this example, Alice uses the key K = S,K e Z26’ which indicates number of 
shifting. By the use of such shift cipher, Oscar cannot obtain the plaintext 
directly. 
The previously shown example is of course not suitable for any real secu-
rity because Oscar can carry out a brute force attack by trying all possible 
K to retrieve the key. However, this naive encryption scheme indeed shows 
some basic ideas on cryptography. Menezes et al. [42] defined cryptography 
as "study of mathematical techniques related to aspects of information se-
curity such as confidentiality, data integrity, entity authentication and data 
origin authentication". The fundamental goal of cryptography is to address 
these aspects in both theory and practice by using adequate mathematical 
techniques in order to defend against malicious activities. 
In real life, in order to provide adequate security, secure algorithms and 
mathematical assumptions are necessary. In the following sections, cryp-
tographic algorithms, protocols and standards on different security context 
are introduced so that basic components of WLAN security are displayed. 
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3.2 Symmetric-key Encryption 
Symmetrical cryptography is the use of cryptographic solutions which make 
use of a shared secret (secret key) that both the sender and the receiver need 
to know in advance. A symmetric encryption algorithm can be described as 
Ek{x) 一 y 
Dxiy)—工 
where E is the encryption function, D the decryption function, K the secret 
key, X the plaintext, and y the ciphertext. 
This section presents various common ciphers for symmetric encryption 
algorithms. DES and AES are block ciphers, which encrypt data in blocks, 
namely portions of plaintexts in a fixed length. RC4 is a stream cipher, 
which encrypts one symbol of a plaintext each time. 
3.2.1 Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
DES is a cipher selected as an official Federal Information Processing Stan-
dard (FIPS) for the United States in 1976, and which has subsequently 
enjoyed widespread use internationally. Details of the DES algorithms are 
covered in [45 . 
DES has a block size of 64 bits while the secret key length is 56 bits. 
The overall algorithm structure consists of 16 identical stages of processing, 
termed rounds, together with an initial and final permutation, respectively 
termed IP and FP which are inverses of each other. Before the main rounds, 
the block is divided into two 32-bit halves and processed alternately. The 
processed two halves are finally rejoined before FP. 
In each round, the right hand side of the block is input to the Feistel 
(F) function with that round's 48-bit subkey, derived from the secret key. 
The result of the function is XORed with the left hand side of the block. 
This combination is the new right hand side of the data block while the new 
left hand side is just the previous right hand side. The F function provides 
non-linear transpositions and permutations on the input data block. 
The major security concern on DES is its relatively short key length. 
56-bit key are easy to break using brute force attack by today's measure. 
Therefore, a new block cipher AES was introduced as a replacement on DES. 
3.2.2 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
AES [18], also known as Rijndael, is a block cipher adopted by U.S. National 
Institute of Standards and Technolgoy (NIST) as an encryption standard in 
2001. AES has a block size of 128 bits and a key size of 128, 192 or 256 bits, 
which is much more secure against brute force attack. 
, CHAPTER 3. CRYPTOGRAPHY 16 
AES operates on a 4 x 4 array of bytes, termed the state. If the key size is 
128 bits, expansion of key is done at first. Similar to DES, AES encryption 
consists of rounds. Number of rounds to execute depends on the key size. 
For example, 128-bit keys require 10 rounds. Each round consists of four 
main parts which is shown below. 
1. SubBytes - a non-linear substitution step where each byte is replaced 
with another according to a lookup table 
2. ShiftRows - a transposition step where each row of the state is shifted 
cyclically a certain number of steps 
3. MixColumns - a mixing operation which operates on the columns of 
the state, combing the four bytes in each column using a linear trans-
formation 
4. AddRoundKey - each byte of the state is combined with the round key 
which is derived from the secret key 
3.2.3 R C 4 
RC4 (or ARCFOUR [32]), designed in 1997, is the most widely-used software 
stream cipher and is used in popular protocols such as Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL) and WEP. Key size of RC4 can be 64 or 128 bits while the encryption 
operations are byte-oriented. 
To carry out encryption, RC4 first generates a pseudorandom stream of 
bits called keystream, using the pseudorandom generation algorithm (PRGA), 
by making use of a secret internal state consisting of a permutation of all 
256 possible bytes and two 8-bit index pointers. The permutation is initial-
ized with the secret key, using the key-scheduling algorithm (KSA). Once 
the keystream is computed, it is XORed with the plaintext to obtain the 
resulted ciphertext. 
In 2001, a cryptanalysis on the KSA of RC4 was discovered by Fluhrer, 
Mantin and Shamir [26]. The statistics for the first few bytes of output 
keystream are strongly non-random, leaking information about the key. This 
caused a scramble for WEP and led to the use of AES instead in IEEE 
802.11i. 
3.3 Public-key Cryptography 
The main problem of using the previously mentioned symmetric-key crypto-
graphic systems is that all participants must know the secret key to be able 
to communicate efficiently. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman came up with the 
idea of public-key systems [21]. The next year, the idea becomes practical 
due to the invention of RSA cryptosystem by Rivest, Shamir and Adle-
man [55]. There are other public-key systems that are based on the same 
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ideas but exploit different mathematical problems to achieve the resulting 
systems. The following sections discuss several common public-key cryp-
tosystems based on different mathematical assumptions. The areas of the 
cryptosystems include encryption and digital signature schemes. 
The basic idea behind the public-key cryptography is the one-way func-
tion, trapdoor one-way function and the fact that the key is a pair of keys. 
The key pair consists of a public key which is distributed publicly, and a 
private key which should be kept secret. Roughly speaking, the one-way 
function is a mathematical function which is easy to compute in one direc-
tion, but believed to be difficult to compute in the opposite direction. The 
trapdoor one-way function is very similar to the one-way function except 
that with special "trapdoor" information, the computation in the opposite 
direction becomes easy. 
Although usually having a slower speed and requiring a longer key length 
for the same level of security, public-key cryptography has some advantages 
over symmetric-key cryptography. It has better key management as a user 
only needs to store its own private key, but not all keys shared with other 
users. Also, it does not have to create secure channels to all other users in 
order to distribute the shared secret keys. 
3.3.1 R S A Problem and Related Encryption Schemes 
The RSA cryptosystem is based on the trapdoor one-way function f •• I^n — 
Ziv: 
f[x) = x^ mod N 
where AT is a product of two distinct large primes, p and q. The trapdoor 
information is the factorization of N. 
The RSA problem is to find a value d such that 
= [f{x)]'^ = x (mod N) or 
ed = 1 (mod (t>{N)) 
where (p is the Euler-phi function. 
By the assumption that solving RSA problem is hard, an encryption 
scheme was constructed. Suppose a user Alice wishes to allow Bob to send 
her a private message M over an insecure channel. She first generates her 
key pair as follows and distributes her public key: 
1. Choose two distinct and independent large primes p and q randomly 
and compute N = pq. 
2. Choose an integer 1 < e < 0(AO which is coprime to (t)(N) where 
綱 = ( p - l)(q - 1) 
3. Computer d such that ed = 1 (mod (f){N)). 
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4. Public key: (e, iV); private key: (d, N) 
After Bob obtains the public key, he turns the plaintext M into a number 
m < N, using some previously agreed-upon reversible protocol known as a 
padding scheme. Then he computes the ciphertext 
c = rrf mod N 
and sends c to Alice. Alice decrypts c to obtain m by computing 
m = c^ mod N 
and then gets M by reversing the padding scheme. 
The best known attacks on RSA depend on solving the problem of fac-
toring very large numbers. Since "short-cut" methods on calculation of 
factoring exist, key length of RSA cryptosystems is required to be longer 
than that of symmetric-key cryptosystmes so as to provide the same secu-
rity level. The most widely used key length (size of N) nowadays is 1024 
bits. 
3.3.2 Discrete Logarithm Problem and Related Encryption 
Schemes 
Modular exponentiation is a one-way function. Computing the correspond-
ing inverse, namely the discrete logarithm (DL) problem is considered a hard 
problem. The DL problem concerns about solving a from 
a^ = (3 (mod p) 
given a prime p, generator a G Zp, and p G Z*. The notation of Z^ repre-
sents the group of integers from 0 to n - 1. The starred form is the mul-
tiplicative group of Zn, which contains all elements not dividing n. More 
formally, 
Z*^ = {aeZn\ gcd(a,n) = 1} 
. I f n is a prime, Z* = Zn-i . 
One public-key cryptosystem based on the DL problem is ElGamal en-
cryption scheme [23] • Suppose a user Alice wishes to allow Bob to send her 
a private message M over an insecure channel. She first generates her key 
pair and distributes her public key. The private key is (a,p) while the public 
key is {a,P,p). Then Bob selects a secret random number k G Zp_i and 
carries out encryption on the plaintext m to obtain the ciphertext (2/1,2/2) 
as follows: 
yi = a^ mod p 
1/2 二 oc/Sk mod p 
On Alice's side, to decrypt the ciphertext, she computes 
m = 2/22/广 mod p 
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3.3.3 Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems 
Elliptic curve cryptosystems were first proposed independently by Miller [43 
and Koblitz [35] in the mid-1980s. They are analogs of existing public-key 
cryptosystems in which modular arithmetic is replaced by operations defined 
over elliptic curves, such as point addition and multiplication. 
The set of points on a elliptic curve in Zp forms a group, analogous to 
group Zp. For example, the elliptic curve y^ = x^ -h ax -h b over Zp where p 
is prime and p > 3 is the set of solution {x,y) G Zp x Zp to the congruence 
y^ = x^ + ax+ b (mod p) 
The constants a and b are chosen such that + 276^ • 0 (mod p). There 
is also a special point O called the point at infinity. 
The security of the elliptic curve cryptosystems depends on the hard 
problem: Given two points G and Y on an elliptic curve such that Y = kG, 
find the integer k. This problem is commonly referred to as the elliptic curve 
discrete logarithm problem. For systems based on modular DL problem, 
groups from elliptic curve can be used instead of groups of Zp so as to achieve 
a shorter key length because no good "short-cut" method on computing 
elliptic curve DL problem has been found. 
3.3.4 Digital Signature 
Digital signatures are a method of authenticating digital information anal-
ogous to ordinary physical signatures on paper. Often, digital signature 
schemes rely on public-key cryptography. They provide non-reputation and 
message authentication properties. 
Suppose Alice sends a message to Bob and wants to be able to prove it 
comes from her. She sends a message to Bob together with a digital signature 
generated using her private key. On receipt, Bob can check whether the 
message really comes from Alice by running a verification algorithm on the 
signature together with the message and Alice's public key. If it passes, the 
message is really from Alice. 
The RSA digital signature scheme [38] is presented here as an example. 
The secret key of Alice is {d, N) and the public key (e, N) as defined before. 
To sign a message m, Alice computes 
s = m^ mod N 
to obtain the signature s. Bob can verify the signature by checking whether 
m = s^ mod N 
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3.4 Public Key Infrastructure 
Public-key cryptography solves one of the biggest problems with key man-
agement by allowing the public key to be available to everybody. This cuts 
down the key management overhead enormously. However, this approach 
still has a problem that an attacker can fake a public key and say that 
the key belongs to someone else. So a mechanism is required to verify the 
validity of the public key. The solution is public-key infrastructure (PKI). 
PKI is a comprehensive cryptography framework offering confidential-
ity, data integrity, authentication and non-repudiation, by using public-key 
cryptography. The mandatory components of the PKI include the following: 
User' key pair The key pair consists of public and private keys of a user. 
Digital certificate The certificate contains public key and other user in-
formation signed by a certificate authority. The IETF (Internet Engi-
neering Task Force) standard for this certificate is named X.509 [30 . 
Certificate Authority (CA) The CA is trusted by the public to verify 
the public keys of others. It is responsible for managing a name space 
of unique user names, authorizing entities, generating key pairs and 
creating certificates. 
A certificate can bind the user's identity with his public key. Other 
user can check the validity of the certificate by verifying the issuer's digital 
signature inside the certificate, following a certificate chain until a trusted 
CA is reached. X.509 standard states the fields a certificate holds and what 
they mean. All X.509 certificates have the following data: 
Version The version of the X.509 applying to the certificate. 
Subject name The name of the entity whose public key the certificate 
identifies. 
Public key The public key the entity being named. 
Issuer name The X.500 [15] name of the entity that signed the certificate, 
normally a CA. 
Issuer signature The digital signature signed by the issuer. 
Serial number A number for the issuer to distinguish the certificate from 
others. 
Validity period The period the certificate is valid. 
PKI provides a systematic means to manage keys. However, PKI has 
the following major shortcomings: 
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1. Revocation of a certificate is carried out when the certificate expires, 
the private key is compromised or the user information is changed. 
Certificates should be publicly accessible and ubiquitous so that other 
people can obtain any new or revoked certificates. Usually certificate 
directories, namely repositories, are used for this purpose. However, 
in some situations, for instance a user does not have Internet access, 
it is difficult to obtain certificates of other users. 
2. A user may choose to send his certificate during the communication to 
others on demand instead of using the above approach. Nevertheless, 
the transmission of the certificate not only occupies bandwidth, but 
also requires verification of CA's signature in real-time. This lowers 
the efficiency of cryptosystems. 
3. In order to allow users to check for revocation of certificates, a certifi-
cate revocation list (CRL) is maintained by the authority. Nonetheless, 
a fine-grained mechanism for receiving and checking the CRL profile 
has not yet been developed. Also, accessing the CRL requires extra 
communication and processing. 
The first two problems motivate the development of identity-based cryptog-
raphy, which is covered in Section 3.8. 
3.5 Hash Functions and Message Authentication 
Code 
A hash function is a mathematical function that maps a large domain into 
a smaller range. While an input of the function can be of arbitrary length, 
the output, called a hash-value or a hash, is of some fixed length. Hash 
functions are used in many cryptographic areas, and the functions have 
different properties in different applications. Examples include digital sig-
nature, data integrity and identification, For instance, instead of signing the 
whole document, a user may sign on the hashed document in order to fasten 
the speed. 
One of the major properties of a hash function is being one-way. Al-
though a hash-value is not unique for all inputs, the corresponding inputs 
should be hard to find from a given hash. Another important property is 
collision resistance. It should be hard to find two inputs of free choice which 
give the same hash. 
Common hash functions include Message Digest Algorithm version 4 
and 5 (MD4 [53], MD5 [54]) and Secure Hash Algorithm and its revised 
forms (SHA, SHA-1, SHA-256, etc. [22]). MD4, MD5 and SHA were bro-
ken (collisions are found by algorithms faster than brute force attack) and 
cryptographers suggest to use newer version of SHA such as SHA-256. 
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3.5.1 S H A - 2 5 6 
SHA-256 is the successor of SHA and SHA-1. SHA-0 and SHA-1 produce a 
160-bit hash from a message with a maximum size of bits, and is based 
on principles similar to those used in MD4 and MD5. SHA-256 instead 
outputs a 256-bit hash which is more secure against brute force attack. 
Also, no known compromise on SHA-256 has been found so far. A brief 
introduction on SHA-256 algorithm is shown as follows: 
1. Pre-processing: given the original input bitstring, append a single "1"-
bit and then enough ” 0”-bits to get a bit length that is a multiple 
of 512 minus 64 bits. There last 64 bits are filled with the binary 
representation of the original message length modulus 
2. Formatted message is broken into 512-bit chunks. 
3. Each chunk is process in turn by applying a number of rounds and 
steps, after it is broken into 32-bit words. Chaining variables are 
defined in order to "chain" the outputs after processing of each chunk. 
4. Before the first chunk is processed, the chaining variables are initial-
ized with specified constant. Different bitwise operations are applied 
among the chaining variables and and the words. The output values 
are assigned back to the chaining variables at the end of each round 
of of word processing. 
5. After all words of a chunk are processed, a chunk hash stored by 8 
working variables is produced depending on the values of chaining 
variables and the chunk hash of previous round. The overall result is 
obtained through the concatenation of the resulted working variables. 
3.5.2 Message Authentication Code 
A message authentication code (MAC) is a short piece of information used 
to authenticate a message. In other words, the MAC provides message 
authentication. A MAC algorithm accepts as input a secret key as well as 
the message and generates a valid MAC from hash functions or from block 
cipher algorithms. 
In the case that a hash function is used, the MAC is called a keyed-hash 
message authentication code, or HMAC [37]. Any iterative cryptographic 
hash function, such as SHA-256, may be used in the caluclation of an HMAC. 
The cryptographic strength of the HMAC depends upon the cryptographic 
strength of the underlying hash function and on the size and quality of the 
key. The output length is the same as the underlying hash function. HMAC 
is defined as 
HMACK(m) = ① 尔acOllm)) 
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,where h is an hash function, K is a secret key padded to the block size of 
the hash function (512 bits for SHA-256), ipad and opad are 64 repetitions 
of bytes 0x36 and 0x5c respectively, represented in hexadecimal. 
3.6 Entity Authentication 
Entity authentication, or identification, is the process where one entity (veri-
fier) is assured of the identity of another entity (prover) involved in a protocol 
by the evidence presented by the prover, and that the prover has actually 
participated. The authentication process should be secure against imper-
sonation of valid parties from any adversary. 
Security of an cryptographic identification scheme usually depends on 
something known to the prover, for instance, a password, a secret or private 
key. Knowledge of such information is demonstrated in a challenge-response 
mechanism. The challenge is typically selected randomly by the verifier. 
The prover has to response on the challenge message using his secret knowl-
edge. However, this approach might reveal some partial information about 
the prover's secret because an adversarial verifier might strategically select 
challenges to obtain responses providing such information. To address these 
concerns, the concept of zero-knowledge (ZK) was introduced. By adding a 
commitment sent from the prover to the verifier, a adequate ZK identifica-
tion protocol reveals no information about the secret because the response 
is based on both the commitment and the challenge, rather than only the 
challenge. 
Entity authentication can be achieved by symmetric-key or public-key 
technique. The following describes two symmetric-key identification schemes 
and Section 3.8.2 describes an identity-based public-key identification scheme. 
3.6.1 I S O / I E C 9798-4 Three-pass Mutual 
ISO/IEC 9748-4 defines an entity authentication scheme [31] which provides 
mutual authentication through a three-pass challenge-response mechanism 
based on HMAC. The protocol is described in the following: 
A ^ B - . t b (1) 
A^B: HMACK(rB,rA, A) (3) 
r^ and tb are random number generated by A and B respectively. K is the 
secret key shared by both A and B. Upon reception of (2) and (3), B and 
A respectively checks the validity of the HMACs. 
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3.6.2 I S O / I E C 9798-4 One-pass Unilateral 
ISO/IEC 9798-4 also defines another timestamp-based unilateral authenti-
cation scheme: 
A^B:tA,EMACk(tA,B) 
where tA is the timestamp obtained from A's local clock. Upon receiving the 
timestamped message, B obtains the current time from its own clock and 
subtracts the timestamp received. The received message is valid provided 
that the difference in time is within the acceptance window calculated from 
the maximum message transit and processing time. 
3.7 Key Establishment 
A key establishment process generates a shared secret key between two or 
more parties for subsequent cryptographic use though their communication. 
In most cases, the key established is a session key. There are two categories 
on key establishment, key transport and key agreement (key exchange). A 
key transport protocol allows an entity to generate a secret key and securely 
transferred to another, while in a key agreement protocol, secret key gen-
eration is based on information contributed by both parties. Usually, key 
authentication property is added to the key transport or key agreement pro-
tocols. Otherwise, an adversary can carry out man-in-the-middle attack and 
obtain the session key shared by both ends of the protocol execution. 
When Alice wants to transfer a session key to another entity Bob by 
some means of key transport, she may simply encrypt the key with their 
long-term shared secret key or with Bob's public key. Then implicit key 
authentication can be assured because only Bob can decrypt the ciphertext 
and obtain the key. The problem of key transport is that if the long-term 
secret key or the public key is compromised, all the session keys are known. 
In other words, typical key transport protocols do not offer forward secrecy. 
3.7.1 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
Using key agreement can distribute the generation of the key to both sides. 
A very basic key agreement protocol is Diffie-Hellman(DH) key exchange 
protocol [21] shown as follows. 
A ^ B : g^ mod p 
A — B : gb mod p 
a and b are random number generated by A and B respectively, p is a prime 
and p is a generator in Zp. The security of the protocol is based on the 
hardness on solving the Diffie-Hellman problem: Given a cyclic group Zp 
where p is a prime, a generator g of Zp, and elements g�gb G Zp, find g"-^. 
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DH key exchange is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack. In this 
attack, an opponent Oscar intercepts Alice's public value (g^) and sends her 
own public value (g^). When Bob transmits his public value (g^), Oscar 
substitudes it with his own and sends it to Alice. Oscar and Alice thus 
agree on one shared key (g^^), and Oscar and Bob agree on another shared 
key (gbc). This vulnerability is present because DH key exchange does not 
authenticate the participants. Though its vulnerability, DH key exchange 
motivates other secure key agreement protocols based on it. 
3.7.2 Station-to-Station Protocol 
Station-to-Station (STS) protocol [20] is a variant of DH key exchange pro-
tocol. It adds key authentication to the protocol by adding encryption, 
signature or HMAC. The protocol using encryption and signature is as fol-
lows: 
A 一 B : ga mod p 
A — B : gb mod p,Ek(SB(gb,g"")) 
A — 
where k = g^b mod p, Sa and Sb are signing algorithm using A's and B's 
private key respectively 
and Ek is an encryption algorithm. Both A and B 
have to validate the ciphertexts and signatures. 
3.8 Identity-Based Cryptography 
The concept of identity-based (IDB) cryptography was proposed in 1984 by 
Shamir [57]. Identity-based cryptography is a kind of public-key cryptogra-
phy, but it uses human-readable users' identifier information such as email, 
IP address or network access identifier (NAI) instead of a random numerical 
value as the public key. 
The use of IDB cryptography significantly reduces the cost of PKL It 
does not involve certificates, which is either stored online requiring network 
access, or costs extra communication. It also solves some extent of the 
certificate revocation problem by the use of identities appended with a stan-
dardized valid period as the public key, for example, ,,identity\\year”. Then 
the other users do not have to obtain a new public key after the private key 
is renewed. 
There are some additional attractive features in IDB cryptography. It 
is simple to create a group identity. For instance, for a group of people is 
responsible on a duty, they can use the duty as the group identity. More-
over, delegation right can be appended to the identity for all users who is 
authorized to create delegated guest accounts for guests requiring temporary 
cryptographic services. 
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IDB cryptography, however, has its own shortcomings. Because human-
readable identity strings are used as public keys, typos are also public keys. 
Also all practical IDB encryption scheme uses bilinear pairing arithmetic, 
which requires much more computations than simple modular exponentia-
tion [8]. Third, so far all identity-based systems are escrow systems as a 
client's private key can be calculated by the PKG. The key-escrow property 
forces clients to have greater trust on the PKG than the CA in conventional 
PKI because all private keys can be computed by an attacker who compro-
mises the master key of a PKG. Last, unlike conventional PKI, many IDB 
cryptosystems are not based on widely accepted standards and incompatible 
to existing standard systems. 
Each of the IDB cryptosystems has a private key generator (PKG) which 
is responsible to generate private keys to and trusted by all users. The PKG 
carries two algorithms: Setup, Extract. 
Setup The PKG creates its secret master key and system parameters. The 
system parameters are given to all the interested parties by some 
means and remains as a constant system parameter for a long period. 
Extract A user authenticates himself to the PKG and obtains a private key 
associated with his identity. 
For IDB signature and identification schemes, there are many satisfac-
tory solutions, such as [24, 25]. However, there are only a few number of 
practical IDB encryption schemes. Boneh and Franklin proposed an IDB 
encryption scheme based on bilinear pairings techniques [11] while Cocks' 
proposal is based on quadratic residues [17]. Boneh and Franklin's proposal 
is more efficient than Cocks' and its settings motivate many other designs of 
IDB cryptographic schemes. In the following sections, Boneh and Franklin's 
encryption scheme, and Au and Wei identification scheme are introduced. 
The latter is a essential component of our proposed authentication scheme. 
3.8.1 The Boneh-Franklin Encryption Scheme 
The Boneh-Franklin scheme [11] utilizes the bilinear pairing. The admis-
sible bilinear pairing e is defined over two groups of the same prime-order 
q denoted by G and F. Typically, additive notation is used to described 
the operation in G while multiplicative notation for the operation in F. 
In practice, the group G is implemented using group of points on certain 
elliptic curves, and the group F is implemented using a subgroup of the 
multiplicative group of a finite field, e : G x G ^ F, has the following 
properties. 
Bilinear e(aRi,bR2)=各(i?i，丑2严，where Ri, R2 e G and a,b e Z*. 
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Non-degenerate e send all pairs of points in G x G to the identity in F. 
In other words, if i? is a generator of G then e{R, R) is a generator of 
F. 
Computable For all Ri,R2 G G, the map e(Ri,R2) is efficiently com-
putable. 
Known suitable pairings only include Weil and Tate pairings one elliptic 
curves. 
Security of the encryption scheme is based on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman 
(BDH) assumption: Given (G, q, e, P, aP, bP, cP) where a, b and c are chosen 
at random from Zg*’ computing e(P, Py^'' is computationally intractable. 
The scheme provides semantic security [11 . 
Here is the description of the scheme in details: 
Setup Given a security parameter k, the PKG generates groups G and F 
of fc-bit prime order q together with a bilinear pairing e : G x G F 
；picks cryptographic hash functions Hi : {0，1}* — G* and H2 ： 
F {0,1V, where I denotes the length of a plaintext; and picks a 
random master key s G Z* to compute Ppub = sP. The public system 
parameters are {G, F, e, q, I, P, Ppub, H!, H2). 
Extract Given a string ID G {0,1}*, s and the system parameters, the 
PKG returns dw = sHi{ID) G G*. 
Encrypt Given a plaintext M e {0,1}^ Bob computes IA = rP and 幻= 
H2{e{Hi{ID), PpubY)®M, where r is chosen at random from Z*. The 
resulting cipertext C 二 (u, v) is sent to Alice. 
Decrypt Alice decrypts C by computing M = v Q H2(e(djD,u)}. 
3.8.2 All and Wei 's Identification Scheme and Signature Scheme 
All and Wei's identification scheme [7] is built on Paillier setting [48], which 
does not involve the use of bilinear pairings. Security of the scheme is based 
on the assumption that RSA [TV, A^ ] problem, an instance of RSA problem, 
with the modulus and the public exponent both equal to N, is hard. The 
scheme is secure against impersonation attack by passive, active and con-
current adversary [9]. 
The identification scheme is a commitment-challenge-response protocol. 
Its works as follows: 
Setup (MKg) The PKG generates two safe prime p and q, and computes 
N = pq. It generates g of order in multiple of N. Also it chooses 
two cryptographic hash functions Hi : {0,1}* — Q^AT, where Q R " 
denotes the quadratic residues of N, and H2 ： — { 0 , w h e r e I 
is a security parameter. The master secret is (p, q). The public system 
parameters are (iV,g,Hi,H2). 
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Extract (UKg) Given an identity I, the PKG computes Q = Hi (I), and 
(x,y) e (ZAT X QRjv) such that g � N 三 Q (mod N^). is the 
private key corresponding to the public key I. 
Interactive protocol (P ) Suppose Alice wants to authenticate herself to 
Bob, she executes the protocol as follows: 
A B : t 二 Ihi^gTuN mod N'^) , where r and u are random number 
A <r- B : c , di random challenge 
A^B:z = {zi,z2) = { r - cx, uy''') G (Z x Z^ ) 
Verification {V) Bob verifies Alice by checking t = Hii^CTg〜空 mod N"^�. 
Besides constructing an identity-based identification scheme, Au and Wei 
also suggested the IDB signature and IDB ring signature derived from their 
identification scheme, as well as the conversion to apply Paillier setting to 
Cocks IDB encryption scheme so that the setting can be used in various 
cryptographic mechanisms. The signature generation and the verification of 
IDB signature scheme are described as follows: 
Signature generation For a message m, the signer with identity I com-
putes: 
t = mod 妒），where r and u are random number 
c = Hi (m) 
z = {zi,z2) = {r- cx, uy-c) G (Z x Z ^ ) 
The signature is (t, z). 
Verification After receiving m and {t,z), the verifier checks that 
t = modiV2) 
where c = Hi (m) and Q = Hi (/) 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 4 
Basics of WLAN Security 
and WEP 
4.1 Basics of WLAN Security 
4.1.1 Overview on " O l d " W L A N Security 
Due to the threads explored in Chapter 2, a WLAN should employ differ-
ent means of security. In brief, the traffic in a WLAN should be kept away 
from eavesdropping, modifying and accessing by any intruders. IEEE 802.11 
specification contains several security features, including the use of Service 
Set Identifier (SSID) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). However, vul-
nerabilities are found in each of the measures. 
The following sections cover various security measures on WLAN and 
their security analysis. It is summarized that without applying the new for-
mal standard IEEE 802.11i, the entity authentication of IEEE 802.11 WLAN 
is not secure enough to provide mutual authentication, key derivation which 
in turn protects the confidentiality, and other security requirements. 
4.1.2 Some Basic Security Measures 
The following includes some basic security measures applied in a WLAN, 
providing minimal security. 
Physical measures 
Although the physical nature of a WLAN is far less secure than that of a 
wired LAN, some physical measures can still be applied in order to provide 
minimal security. Firstly, by using suitable antennas in access points, the 
reception area can be limited and thus an attacker needs more afford to enter 
the area. For example, a directional Yagi patch antenna limits the radiation 
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to a fixed angle in a direction; and a patch antenna limits the radiation to 
a circular area in a direction. 
Secondly, a suitable Effective Isotropic Radiated Power (EIRP), which 
is determined by the transmitter power and antenna gain, should be chosen 
in order to limit the reception area. 
Service Set Identifier (SSID) 
Defined in IEEE 802.11, the SSID is a construct which allows logical par-
tition of WLANs. The SSID is a network name that identifies the area 
covered by one or more APs. In a commonly used mode, anAP periodically 
broadcasts its SSID in a beacon, allowing stations wishing to associate with 
the AP to choose the AP based on its SSID. 
In another mode of operation (Closed Network Access Control), the SSID 
is not broadcast and thus stations wishing to associate with the AP must 
already have its SSID configured to be the same as that of the AP. In this 
case, a client station must be manually configured with the appropriate 
SSID to gain access to the WLAN. However, the SSIS is still included in 
some management frames in IEEE 802.11 and always sent in the clear. An 
attacker can still sniff the SSID by just waiting until someone associates to 
the WLAN. In addition, many WLAN administrators make the attack even 
easier by using the vendor's default SSID, which are pretty well known. 
M A C address authentication 
MAC address authentication is not specified in the 802.11 standard, but 
many vendors support it. The authentication verifies the client's MAC ad-
dress against a locally configured list (Access Control List, ACL for short) 
of allowed addresses or against an external authentication server, reducing 
the likelihood of unauthorized devices accessing the network. 
Vulnerabilities appear in MAC address authentication because the MAC 
addresses are sent in the clear as required by the 802.11 standard. As a 
result, an attacker can subvert the MAC authentication process by spoofing 
a valid MAC address by using network interface cards (NICs) supporting 
this feature. 
4.1.3 Virtual Private Network ( V P N ) 
A VPN is a private communication network usually used within an organiza-
tion, communicating over a public network. VPN message traffic is carried 
on public networking infrastructure, such as the Internet, using standard 
protocols, such as TCP/IP. 
Secure VPNs use cryptographic tunneling protocols to provide the nec-
essary confidentiality, sender authentication and message integrity so that 
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users can communicate securely over unsecured networks. The most popular 
VPN system is based on IPsec. 
To utilize a VPN, stations connecting to APs in a WLAN are consid-
ered untmsted and kept away from the cooperate LAN by firewalls (VPN 
gateways). In order to access the LAN, a user must first create a VPN 
tunnel by authenticating himself to the VPN authentication server. Then 
the VPN tunneling protocol provides encryption and data integrity during 
communication between the wireless stations and the LAN. 
While the VPN was the most secure measure in WLAN before the in-
troduction of IEEE 802.Hi and still has similar security level compared 
with 802.Hi, it suffers from performance inefficiency. All wireless stations 
accessing public network have to communication through VPN gateways, 
which become the bottlenecks. A typical VPN gateway can achieve 30-50 
mbits/sec throughput. So about 8 wireless stations can overload a VPN 
gateway. A high system installation cost is required if a large number of 
users is involved. 
4.2 WEP 
4.2.1 Overview on Wired Equivalent Privacy ( W E P ) 
As stated by IEEE, WEP is designed to protect users of a WLAN from 
casual eavesdropping and was selected to meet the following criteria: 
• Reasonably strong encryption - It relies on the difficulty of recovering 
the secret key through a brute force attack. The difficultly grows with 
key length. 
• Self-synchronizing - Each packet contains the information required to 
decrypt it and it does not have to deal with lost packets. 
• Computationally efficient - It can be reasonably implemented in soft-
ware. 
• Exportable - The key length is limited leading to a greater possibility 
of export beyond U.S. borders. 
• Optional - It is an option not required in a WLAN. 
WEP aims to provide confidentiality by encryption and data integrity 
by integrity check value (ICV). It is also used in IEEE 802.11 entity authen-
tication. WEP protects links of a network, rather than provides end-to-end 
protection like what a VPN does. The following describes the algorithm of 
each cryptographic service. 
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I 
IEEE 802.11 authentication 
Before a wireless station associates with an AP and gains access to a WLAN, 
it must perform authentication. Two types of entity authentication are 
defined in IEEE 802.11: open system and shared key. 
Open system authentication protocol simply consists of an authentica-
tion request message containing the station identity and an authentication 
response message containing the authentication result from the AP. The “ au-
thentication" protocol in fact allows the station to notify the access point 
rather than have a secure authentication. On success, both the station and 
the access point are considered to be mutually authenticated. 
Shared key authentication is obtained through the unidirectional challenge-
response mechanism. It makes use of the WEP encryption. The client sta-
tion should know the WEP secret key in advance in order to answer the 
challenge by encrypting it. The message flow of the protocol is as follows: 
STA — AP : authentication request 
STA — AP : 128 bytes challenge text 
STA -> AP : encrypted challenge text 
STA AP : authentication response 
W E P encryption and decryption 
WEP encryption algorithm is constructed from a RC4 symmetric-key stream 
cipher. A WEP secret key is 40 or 104 bits long, and shared by both 
communicating parties. The algorithm operates as follows: 
1. On the transmitting station, which may be a client station or a AP, 
the 40-bit secret key is concatenated with a 24-bit Initialization Vector 
(IV) to produce a seed for input into the WEP pseudorandom gener-
ator (PRNG), which is essentially the RC4 cipher excluding the last 
XOR operation. 
2. A long plaintext is fragmented through fragmentation. Each fragment 
is known as a plaintext Protocol Data Unit (PDU). 
3. The seed is passed into the PRGA to produce a keystream of pseudo-
random octets. 
4. The 32-bit Integrity Check Value (ICV) of the plaintext PDU is ob-
tained through the CRC-32 (32-bit cyclic redundancy checksun) in-
tegrity algorithm and appended to the plaintext PDU. 
5. The resulted value is XORed with the keystream to produce the ci-
phertext PDU appended with encrypted ICV. 
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6. The actual data sent in the data frame is (IV || ciphertext PDU | 
encrypted ICV). 
The decryption algorithm is just the reverse of the encrytpion. As IV 
is sent in clear, the receiver is able obtain the keystream corresponding to 
the IV and the WEP secret key. After decryption, the recovered plaintext 
is verified by comparison between the recovered ICV and the ICV obtained 
from the CRC-32 algorithm on the recovered plaintext. 
4.2.2 Security Analysis on W E P 
Although WEP incorporates several mechanisms to help secure wireless traf-
fic, many attacks have surfaced over time, demonstrating that the design 
goals were not achieved and WEP is unable to provide adequate security. 
The following sections analyze different attacks on WEP and show its failure 
on authentication, confidentiality and data integrity. 
Attacks on unidirectional authentication 
When shared key authentication is used, only the client station is authen-
ticated to the AP. As a result, it suffers from man-in-the-middle attack. 
When an attacker receives a authentication request message, it forwards the 
message to the AP. He then receives the challenge from the AP, sends the 
challenge to the legitimate station and obtains the valid response from the 
station. He finally completes the process by returning the valid authentica-
tion response to the AP and creates another authentication instance to the 
station. 
In this way, the attacker is able to act as a AP and a client station 
and associate to the legitimate station and AP respectively. Although the 
attacker cannot obtain the WEP secret key, he can control all network traffic 
from the client station and carry out other more dangerous attacks in a 
simple manner. 
Authentication spoofing 
In the first glance, the shared key authentication seems to be much more 
secure than the open authentication. However, this is not the truth. The 
challenge and response messages provide an eavesdropper with useful infor-
mation that can compromise a network. This attack is known as authenti-
cation spoofing [6]. 
By listening to the shared key authentication handshake, the eavesdrop-
per obtains the initial unencrypted challenge message (m) and the IV from 
the AP and the encrypted message (c) from the client station. Then he can 
obtain the keystream k corresponding to that IV from a known plaintext 
attack as follows: 
k = (m||ICV) e c 
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Since the AP will not check whether the IV is reused, the eavesdropper 
can use the same keystream and IV to answer the challenge in another 
authentication session. In this way, an attacker can join the network without 
knowing the secret key. 
This attack does not allow the attacker to communicate because data 
frames are encrypted with WEP. However, he can inject a packet by encrypt-
ing the packet by the keystream obtained and reusing its corresponding IV, 
without the knowledge on the secret key. Also, some attacks compromis-
ing the WEP secret key and described in the following requires plaintext-
ciphertext pairs. The shared key authentication thus provides a convenient 
way for the attacker to obtain such pairs and carry out other more threat-
ening attack. 
Packet modification 
Borisov et al. [12] discovered a weakness on the ICV which threaten the 
data integrity. The fact that CRC-32 algorithm is a linear function and 
independent to the WEP secret key and IV can compromise data integrity. 
The ICV, which is a CRC checksum, is designed to detect random errors, but 
not malicious or intentional modifications. An attacker can easily modify 
both the actual data and the corresponding ICV in order to pass inspection, 
making a successful message forgery. 
Let m and m' be the original message and modified message respectively, 
c and c' the original ciphertext and modified ciphertext, A 二 M � TTT/ the dif-
ferent between m and m', k the keystream corresponding to a particular IV 
reused in modified packet. The following shown the process of modification 
mathematically. 
c, = �(m,||CRC(m')) 
c' = ke{{m® A) 1  CRC (m 0 A)) 
c' = k®{{m® A)||(CRC(m) 0 CRC(A))) 
c ' - f c e ((m||CRC(m)) 0 (A||CRC(A))) 
c' = ce(A||CRC(A)) 
The consequences of this attack include the following: 
1. If an attacker knows a portion of a plaintext, he can modify that 
portion and the corresponding checksum to obtain a valid ciphertext. 
2. An attacker can guess the IP address of a packet, modify it, as well as 
the IP checksum, and obtain the recovered plaintext at the modified 
address. This is known as IP redirection attack. This attack is based 
on the fact that an IP address is at fixed field encapsulated in IEEE 
802.11 MAC frames. If an IP checksum is known, an attacker can 
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simply carry out arithmetic as the IP checksum is also linear. But if 
the IP checksum is not known, he will have to guess it. 
3. An attacker can carry out TCP reaction attack. By careful modifi-
cation of an intercepted packet [12], he can know whether the TCP 
checksum is valid by checking whether an ACK is received. 
• The modified ciphertext is obtained by = c � A , where A is 
the bit positions to flip. 
• The attacker chooses A by picking i arbitrarily, and setting po-
sitions i and i + 16 of A to 1 and the rest to 0. 
• The attacker obtains one bit of information about the packet by 
the property that if the XORed result of the original plaintext at 
position i and i + 16 is 1, the TCP checksum will be valid. 
The attacker can repeat many times to discover the entire packet. 
RC4 key schedule attack 
WEP makes use of RC4 to generate pseudorandom key stream. Since 1994, 
researchers have identified a series of small flaws in RC4, none of which 
resulted in a practical attack. However, Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir [26 
finally found an algorithmic attack on RC4 key scheduling algorithm (also 
known as Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir attack) resulting in recovery of the secret 
key. The recovery is in linear time with respect to the key size, and this 
means attack on 104-bit WEP is only slightly more difficult than that on 
40-bit WEP. The attack is practical on WEP because of the use of IV. 
Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir revealed that if the first A bytes of the secret 
key s is known (initially A 二 0), and the following criteria are fulfilled, an 
attacker can recover the A + 1-th byte of the key with an accuracy of 5%. 
• The attacker gets a series of about 60 different packets encrypted with 
RC4 keys started with the 3 bytes {A + 3 ,0xFF,X) where X is any 
byte value and different in each packet. These keys are consider as 
weak keys. 
• The attacker knows the first byte of the keystream used to encrypt the 
packets collected. This is equivalent to knowing the first byte of each 
of the plaintext. 
With such class of keys, the first byte of the keystream is determined by 
the equation: S[S[l] + S[S[1]]] = S[A + 3] where S is the S-box used in 
the implementation of RC4, computed according to the RC4 key. Then, the 
attacker can reverse the KSA to find the A + 1-th key byte from the known 
information. The process can be iterated in order to recover the whole secret 
key byte by byte. 
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This attack is practical for retrieving WEP secret key because first 3 
bytes of the key used in RC4 are in fact the IV. Any WEP encrypted packet 
is started with the IV which is sent in clear. Moreover, the first byte of the 
plaintext can also be found as in IP data-networking environment, the first 
byte of the vast majority of packets is OxAA, a value in IP packet header. 
An attacker can make use of this information determine the first byte of the 
WEP secret key. Consequently, the attacker knows the first four bytes of 
the RC4 key and thus can find the second byte of the WEP key via the same 
way. By collecting enough packets, he can iterate the process to retrieve the 
whole key. 
This attack has already been implemented on software like AirSnort and 
WEP Crack. Stubblefield et al. [59] carried out experiment with typical 
equipments (PIII/500 MHz laptop with Linux) and found that between 5 
to 6 million packets are needed in order to recover a 104-bit key in an 
unoptimized situation. Recovering this quantity of packets depends on the 
network load and can range from less than one hour in a moderately used 
network to several hours in a lightly used network. This practical work has 
shown that no expensive hardware or software is necessary in order to break 
WEP. 
IV collisions 
The authentication spoofing attack is a specific instance of a more general 
attack in which confidentiality of any transmission can be compromised [12 . 
The confidentiality is at risk when any two plaintexts are encrypted with the 
same keystream. Because the keystream depends on a combination of the 
secret key and an IV, and because the secret key is constant, an adversary 
can determine that two messages are encrypted with the same keystream 
simply by comparing the IV sent unencrypted. 
Given two ciphertexts produced with the same keystream k, XORing the 
two ciphertexts together removes the pseudorandom stream generated by 
RC4 and produces the XOR of the two corresponding plaintexts. An active 
adversary from a wired station can send a chosen plaintext over the wireless 
network and observe the encrypted message to obtain the keystream of a 
particular IV. For an adversary not able to access the wired LAN, he can 
utilize the expected distribution of the plaintexts to predict the contents 
since much of network traffic contents is predictable. A more aggressive 
attacker can inject packets to the WLAN, observe responses from upper 
layer protocols and gain information on a plaintext from the responses. TCP 
reaction attack introduced before is one of the examples. Another is an 
inductive chosen plaintext attack based on this technique was introduced 
by Arbaugh [5]. This attack involves inductively constructing and sending 
specially formatted packet, and observing the response of DHCP protocol. 
Such attacks would not be possible if IVs were non-repeating. However, 
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with a 24-bit IV, at most possible values exist. According to [60], IV 
collision occurs with 50% probability after 4823 encrypted frames, and 99% 
after 12430 encrypted frames. In high-traffic environments, IVs are guaran-
teed to repeat in a matter of hours. Even worse, many vendors choose to 
reinitialize the IV to zero every time the AP or client station is restarted. 
This practice means the IV is likely to be a low-value number that was 
recently used, resulting in even more collisions. 
Although such attack does not reveal the WEP secret key, an attacker 
can completely compromise the system using a dictionary attack. Once he 
successfully decrypts ciphertexts with different IV, he can build a table that 
lists the keystream corresponding to each IV. This table isapproximately 
23.5 GB, well within range of today's computer storage. Since IV space is 
fixed and the attack does not involve the secret key, WEP is "unsafe at any 
key size" [60 . 
Brute force attack 
WEP allows the use of 40-bit keys. Keys of such short length are easy to 
break. About 200 days are needed to obtain a 40-bit key by a PIII/500 
MHZ laptop via brute force attack. Even worse, some vendors allow users 
to enter the key in ASCII characters. This further reduces the entropy of 
the key and time to crack is just about 35 seconds. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 5 
IEEE 802-lli 
5.1 Overview on IEEE 802.Hi and RSN 
The flaws of WEP are introduced in previous sections and we can com-
ment that WEP does not provide sufficient security in WLANs. In order 
to deal with the security concerns on WLANs, the IEEE 802.Hi task group 
was formed and worked on specification providing more rigorous security 
mechanisms. 
Before completion of IEEE 802.Hi standard which is also known as 
WPA2, a transitional industrial standard which is called Wi-Fi Protected 
Access (WPA) was defined by Wi-Fi Alliance. WPA can be considered as 
a subset of 802.Hi standard while providing some extensions. IEEE 802.Hi 
defines a new type of wireless network called robust security network (RSN). 
RSN aims to achieve the same goals as WEP-based network, but in a actu-
ally secure way. 
There are several components consisting RSN. They include a new ac-
cess control and authentication framework based on IEEE 802.IX, improved 
encryption and data integrity algorithms - TKIP and AES-CCMP, and key 
management algorithms. RSN also includes support of independent basic 
service sets (IBSSs), also known as ad hoc wireless networks, and preau-
thentication mechanism which minimizes latency. 
In RSN, a client has to carry out RSN association (RSNA) through the 
802.IX authentication before it can communicate with the network. The 
steps for the association under extended service set (ESS) without using a 
preshared key is as follows: 
1. The client identifies the AP as RSNA-capable from the AP's Beacon 
or Probe Response frames. 
2. The client optionally invoke open system authentication. 
3. The client and the AP negotiate ciphersuites used for encryption and 
data integrity, in data communication after RSNA. 
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4. The client and the AP use IEEE 802.IX to authenticate. 
5. The client and the AP establish temporal keys by executing the key 
management algorithms. The temporal keys are used for encryption 
and data integrity to protect the data link. 
In the following sections, major components of IEEE 802.Hi standard 
are covered. The description is mainly on security of infrastructure mode. 
5.2 IEEE 802.IX Access Control in IEEE 802.11i 
IEEE 802.IX [47] is an IEEE standard for port-based network access con-
trol. The 802.IX framework provides authentication to devices attached to 
a LAN port, establishing a point-to-point connection or preventing access 
from that port if authentication fails. It takes the advantage of Extensible 
Authentication Protocol (EAP) [2 . 
802.IX enhances the enterprise security model by providing the following 
improvements over the ordinary 802.11 authentication. 
• It provides support for a centralized security management model, and 
allows good scalability in terms of the number of APs. 
• The keys used in data communication are unique to each station so 
that traffic on any single key is significantly reduced. 
• It allows the members of the network to generate keys dynamically 
and does not require a network administrator for configuration of pre-
shared keys. 
• It provides open support for strong upper layer authentication, and 
allows flexibility on the choice of EAP methods. 
In the following, we will look at 802.IX standard working in WLANs under 
infrastructure mode, or ESS. 
5.2.1 Participants 
There are three kinds of participants in the 802.IX access control process in 
a WLAN. 
Supplicant The end of the link that responds to an authenticator. It is 
the client requesting to join the network by presenting its credentials 
and following a proper protocol. 
Authenticator The end of the link initiating EAP authentication. In a 
WLAN in ESS , it is an AP that must verify the identity of a supplicant 
before granting the network access. 
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Authentication server (AS) The AS provides an authentication service 
to an authenticator. Typically, it runs the Remote Authentication 
Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) supporting EAP and handling au-
thentication requests relayed by authenticators from supplicants. It 
may maintain a list of valid users and their credentials to validate 
authentication requests. 
5.2.2 Port-based Access Control 
As mentioned before, 802.IX grants per-port access to clients requesting ac-
cess to network resources. A port is a logical entity representing a physical 
connection to a network. There are two types of ports, namely an uncon-
trolled port and a controlled port. Uncontrolled ports allow communication 
between devices on a LAN without having to make an access control deci-
sion, while controlled ports are entry points to the LAN resources protected 
by the authenticator against unauthenticated supplicants. 
To carry out RSN association, a supplicant and an authentication server 
exchange upper layer authentication protocol messages and carry out four-
way handshake via the uncontrolled port. Before a successful association, 
the controlled port is blocked for all non-IEEE 802.IX packets. When the 
supplicant is authenticated by the authentication server and passes the four-
way handshake to generate key hierarchies, the authenticator unlocks the 
controlled port for the supplicant to allow it to access the wired LAN and 
communicate with other wireless stations via the authenticator. 
5.2.3 E A P and E A P O L 
The authentication exchange used in 802.IX takes place over EAR EAP is 
a protocol designed for use in transporting authentication messages. Before 
802.IX became prominent in WLAN authentication, EAP was mainly used 
to authenticate dial-up users. In order for EAP messages to be transported 
on a LAN, they need to be encapsulated. 802.IX defines EAP over LAN, or 
EAPOL for this purpose. EAPOL is applied to encapsulate EAP messages 
between a supplicant and an authenticator during upper layer authentica-
tion, as well as the four-way handshake. 
EAP has four message types: Request, Respond, Success and Failure. 
EAP can encapsulate messages of upper layer authentication protocols in 
its Request and Respond messages. The encapsulated protocol is called 
an EAP method. Request messages are sent from an authentication server 
while Response messages are from a supplicant. The authentication server 
uses the Success or Failure message to notify the supplicant and the authen-
ticator whether the authentication was successful. EAPOL further adds four 
message types: Start, Key, Packet, Logoff. When a supplicant first connects 
to a LAN, it broadcasts the Start message. The Key message is used for 
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information exchange by the key management algorithms. The Packet mes-
sage encapsulates the actual EAP messages. Logoff message indicates that 
the supplicant wishes to be disconnected from the network. 
5.2.4 R A D I U S 
RADIUS is an Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) pro-
tocol [52，50] for applications such as network access. In 802.IX, RADIUS 
protocol is often used to encapsulated the EAP messages exchanged between 
the authenticator and the authentication server. A RADIUS authentication 
server exchanges authentication information with supplicants, authorizes ac-
cess to legitimated supplicants and records the client session information for 
billing and other statistical purposes. Also it is usually used in authentica-
tion between the authenticator and the AS after a supplicant is authenti-
cated by the AS, as well as the transmission of PMK from the AS to the 
authenticator. 
To carry EAP over RADIUS, extensions to RADIUS were defined [51. 
The EAP-Start message was introduced for an authenticator to notify the 
RADIUS server when an execution of EAP authentication is started. 
5.2.5 Authentication Message Exchange 
The authentication message exchange between a supplicant and an authen-
tication server, through an authenticator is encapsulated by EAP, which is 
further encapsulated by other protocols as introduced before. Figure 5.1 
shows an EAP message flow. The AP is not aware of the authentication 
process in details. Instead it is responsible to relay the messages exchanged 
by the supplicant and the AS and only cares about the AS's decision whether 
to grant the client access to the network, through the listening on the EAP-
Success or EAP-failure message. 
At the beginning of an authentication process, EAP-Request and Re-
sponse messages of type Identity are exchanged. The messages allow the 
authenticator and the AS to know the identity of the supplicant in order to 
distinguish different authentication sessions. Following the messages of type 
Identity, EAP-Request and Response messages encapsulating upper layer 
authentication protocols are exchanged in pairs, allowing the transmission 
of actual authentication data. IEEE 802.Hi does not define a standard-
ized upper layer authentication protocol used in 802.IX in order to allow 
flexibility. 
5.2.6 Security Analysis 
In [44], three problems on 802.IX access control are demonstrated. The first 
one is that some EAP methods, such as EAP-MD5 [10], offer only unidi-
rectional authentication and man-in-the-middle attack is possible in such 
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Figure 5.1: EAP message flow for successful authentication. If the access to the network 
were denied, the EAP-Failure messages would replace the EAP-Success messages in the 
figure. 
schemes, allowing an attacker to impersonate an authenticated party. The 
second problem is session hijacking. Since the 802.11 MAC layer manage-
ment frames are unprotected, an attacker can forge a Deassociation frame 
to the authenticator just after the authentication execution and pretend the 
authenticator in later-on communication. The last one is denial-of-service 
(DoS). The attack is brought by the possibility of attacks to forge the EAP-
Failure message and other MAC layer frames. 
The first problem can be prevented by explicitly requiring all ULA pro-
tocols to provide mutual authentication in order to minimize the risk from 
rogue APs. No effective measures can be taken to resist the success of the 
second attack. However, if the ULA protocol provides key establishment, 
the second problem is just converted to another DoS because the adversary 
cannot obtain the derived session key to compromise the confidentiality and 
data integrity. For the last one, DoS attack is always possible in different 
ways in real life. What we can do is to minimize the effect of it. For example, 
protocols should limit the time affected by a successful attack. 
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5.3 RSN Key Management 
Unlike WEP, which uses the same key for message protection and authentica-
tion, IEEE 802.Hi separate the authentication process and message protec-
tion. IEEE 802.Hi allows for automatically generated per-user, per-session 
keys, known as pairwise keys. In addition, these pairwise keys can be re-
generated periodically to increase security, through a process known as re-
keying. Besides the pairwise keys, group keys can also be created by the 
authenticator for multicast and broadcast traffic. 
Besides mutually authenticating both the supplicant and the authentica-
tor, an upper layer authentication protocol in 802.Hi is required to establish 
a Pairwise Master Key (PMK), required to be 256 bits, that a supplicant 
and an authenticator can use for message protection, in the case that any 
pre-shared key mechanism is not available. 
5.3.1 R S N Pairwise Key Hierarchy 
The PMK is at the top of RSN key hierarchy for unicast communication. It is 
transferred from the authentication server to the authenticator after a suc-
cessful authentication through MS-MPPE-Recv-key attribute of RADIUS 
protocol if RADIUS is used. Then both the supplicant and the authentica-
tor can generate the pairwise transient key (PTK) based on the PMK and 
nonces obtained through the four-way handshake, using the pseudorandom 
function defined in 802.11i standard. The PTK can be divided into four 
128-bit keys: 
• Data Encryption key - to protect confidentiality of data communica-
tion 
• Data Integrity key - to protect integrity of data communication 
• EAPOL-Key Encryption key - to protect confidentiality during the 
four-way handshake 
• EAPOL-Key Integrity key - to protect integrity during the four-way 
handshake 
If AES-CCMP is used, the Data Encryption key and Data Integrity key are 
integrated to form the Data Encryption/Integrity key. 
5.3.2 R S N Group Key Hierarchy 
Due to the fact that 802.11 communication also supports multicast and 
broadcast messages, 802.Hi also standardizes a process for generating group 
keys which ensure secure communication for broadcast messaging. 
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The group keys are formed from a 256-bit cryptographic-quality random 
number, known as the Group Master key (GMK), chosen by the authentica-
tor. Then the GMK is used to determine the Group Temporal key (GTK), 
consisting of 128-bit Group Encryption key and 128-bit Group Integrity 
key, which are for confidentiality and integrity for multicast and broadcast 
communication respectively. Again if AES-CCMP is used, a single Group 
Encryption/Integrity key is generated instead. 
5.3.3 Four-way Handshake and Group Key Handshake 
PMK can be generated in two ways. The first is to obtain from a shared 
key while another is to be established through an upper layer authentication 
protocol. The PMK obtained is then used to generate PTK via the four-way 
handshake shown in Figure 5.2. The handshake also deliver the GTK from 
the authenticator to the supplicant. 
Supplicant Authenticator 
^ ANonce. unicast  
BNonce. unicast MIC ^ 
^ Install PTK. unicast. MIC, encrypted GTK  
unicast MIC ^ 
Figure 5.2: Four-way handshake message flow after successful authentication. ANonce 
and SNonce are random number generated by the authenticator and the supplicant re-
spectively. "Unicast" is used to specify the handshake is the Four-way handshake rather 
than a group key delivery. MIC is the message integrity code (considered as a kind of 
HMAC) of previous messages utilizing EAPOL-Key Integrity key. The encryption of GTK 
uses the derived EAPOL-Key Encryption key. 
The handshake messages are encapsulated in EAPOL-Key frames. When 
a successful handshake completes, the authenticator confirms the existence 
of the PMK at the supplicant and the supplicant obtains the GTK. The 
handshake ensures that the temporal keys are fresh and synchronizes the 
installation of the temporal keys. 
If the authenticator later changes the GTK, the supplicant can obtain 
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the new key through the group key handshake. The handshake incudes two 
messages. The authenticator sends the encrypted new GTK with the MIC. 
The supplicant responds with the valid MIC. 
After the four-way handshake, the last step before the setup of the RSN 
association is to open the controlled port by the authenticator. The au-
thenticator also have to authenticate to the authentication server by some 
means, typically through RADIUS protocol. 
Recently, an analysis reveals the possibility of a DoS attack on the four-
way handshake [29]. The attack involves forging initial messages from the 
authenticator to the supplicant to produce inconsistent keys in both parties. 
5.4 RSN Encryption and Data Integrity 
IEEE 802.Hi provides two improved symmetric-key encryption algorithm to 
replace WEP which was broken. They are Temporal Key Integrity Proto-
col (TKIP) and Advanced Encryption Standard-Counter mode-CBC MAC 
Protocol (AES-CCMP). In RSN, WEP encryption is no longer used. How-
ever, backward compatibility can be provided by the Transition Security 
Network, which uses WEP along with CCMP or TKIP. 802.Hi defines both 
TKIP and CCMP while WPA only employs TKIP. 
5.4.1 T K I P 
TKIP was designed to address all the known attacks and deficiencies in the 
WEP algorithm while still maintaining backward compatibility with legacy 
hardware. It was designed to be made available as a firmware or software 
upgrade to existing hardware so that users would be able to upgrade their 
level of security without replacing existing equipment or purchasing new 
hardware. It provides an upgrade path by offering an additional protocol or 
a wrapper around WEP. 
TKIP utilizes the key management scheme of 802.Hi in order to bound 
the probability of successful forgery and the amount of information that 
an attacker can learn about a particular key. TKIP is comprised of the 
following elements: 
• A message integrity code (MIC) provides a keyed cryptographic check-
sum using the source and destination MAC addresses and the plaintext 
data of the 802.11 frame (or MAC service data unit (MSDU)), in order 
to protects against message forgery. 
• A per-packet key mixing mechanism of the IV is used to change the 
encryption key for every MSDU to prevent RC4 key schedule attack. 
• A 64-bit IV and an 48-bit TKIP sequence counter (TSC) to minimize 
the impact from IV collisions and replay attacks. MPDUs received out 
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of order are dropped by the receiver. 
TKIP uses an extended 48-bit TSC extends the life of the temporal 
key and eliminates the need to re-key the temporal key during a single 
association. Since the TSC is updated with each packet, packets can be 
exchanged using a single temporal key before key reuse would occur. Under 
steady, heavy traffic conditions, it would take approximately 100 years for 
key reuse to occur. The TSC is constructed from the first and second byte 
from the original WEP IV and the 4 bytes provided in the extended IV. 
In the TKIP encryption, the temporal Data Encryption key, transmitter 
address, and TSC are combined in a two-phase key mixing function to gen-
erate a per packet key to be used to seed the WEP PRNG. The per packet 
key is 128 bits long and is split into a 104-bit RC4 key and a 24-bit IV for 
presentation to the WEP engine. 
The 8-bit MIC is added to the packet residing before the CRC. It is 
calculated over the source and destination MAC addresses and the MSDU 
plaintext using the MIC function, Michael, seeded by the Data Integrity key 
and the TSC, where Michael is a one-way cryptographic hash function. This 
makes it much more difficult for an attacker to successfully alter packets. If 
necessary, the MSDU is fragmented and a unique MIC is appended to each 
of them. 
The decryption process is the reverse process of the encryption where 
additional checking processes are applied. They include to discard packets 
with TSC smaller than that in previous packets and verification of the MIC 
value. If the MIC values do not match, the recovered MSDU is discarded 
and countermeasures such as rekeying and alerting are executed. 
5.4.2 C C M P 
In addition to TKIP, 802.Hi defines a new encryption method based on AES, 
requiring update on hardware. Similar to other block ciphers, AES can be 
used in various operation modes. The mode that has been chosen for 802.Hi 
is the counter mode with CBC-MAC. The counter mode encryption offers 
data confidentiality while the CBC-MAC delivers message authentication. 
CCMP is recommended to used in the RSN as it offers a better security 
than TKIP. 
When the AES cipher is used in counter mode, it does not directly 
encrypt a plaintext. Instead, it encrypts an arbitrary value called counter 
preload which increments from a seed value, and then XORs the encrypted 
counter preload with each plaintext block. 
In CCMP, the 128-bit Data Encryption/Integrity key is used in the AES 
cipher. The counter preload is formed from a 48-bit IV called the packet 
number (PN), a flag value, data from the frame header (such as the source 
m a c address), and a counter value which is initialized to 1. The plaintext 
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before the encryption is fragmented to produce a number of frames. The 
counter value increments for each plaintext block (128 bits) of a frame. 
For CBC-MAC, CBC stands for cipher block chaining while MAC stands 
for message authentication code. In CCMP, a seed is formed by a flag value, 
the PN, and other data pulled from the header of the frame. The seed is fed 
into an AES cipher block and encrypted by the Data Encryption/Integrity 
key, and its output is XORed with specific elements from the frame header, 
which is then fed into the next AES block. This process continues over the 
remainder of the frame header and the actual plaintext data. The first 64 
bits of the resulted MAC value are extracted as the final MIC output. 
The resulted encrypted message consists of the frame header, the PN, 
the encrypted data blocks and the MIC in specified order. The decryption 
process is essentially the reverse of the encryption process plus the verifica-
tion of the MIC. 
5.5 Upper Layer Authentication Protocols 
5.5.1 Overview on the Upper Layer Authentication 
The IEEE 802.Hi standard does not specify an upper layer authentication 
(ULA) protocol over EAP used in 802.IX authentication process. This is 
because an ULA protocol operates at higher layers of the OSI network layer 
model (usually in TCP/IP layer) and are thus outside the scope of the 802.11 
standard. 
There are a number of popular ULA protocols in use today, primarily in 
enterprise environment, namely network running in infrastructure mode. As 
described before, the protocols are encapsulated by EAP. Some mandatory 
requirements on the ULA protocol are specified in RFC4017 [58]: 
• Generation of a 256-bit PMK. The PMK must have effective key 
strength of at least 128 bits. 
• Mutual authentication between the supplicant and the authentication 
server. 
• Shared state equivalence. After a successful completion of an authen-
tication execution, the supplicant and the authentication server must 
share the same state attributes, such as the session key, identities of 
both the supplicant and the server, etc. 
• Resistance to dictionary attacks. 
• Protection against man-in-the-middle attack. 
• Protected negotiation on the ciphersuits used in the EAP conversation. 
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Also, recommended requirements, including support on fragmentation and 
end-user identity hiding, and optional features, including channel binding 
and fast reconnect are specified. 
Some of the more popular authentication protocols include: the exten-
sible authentication protocol with transport layer security (EAP-TLS) [3], 
the protected extensible authentication protocol (PEAP) [4], Kerberos [36 
and the lightweight extensible authentication protocol (LEAP). 
5.5.2 E A P - T L S 
EAP-TLS is an EAP authentication method used in 802.Hi and WPA envi-
ronment well-supported among wireless vendors. It is a public-key method 
based on the use of PKI and certificates. Original TLS protocol [19] includes 
ciphersuite negotiation, authentication with key exchange and symmetric-
key encryption. EAP-TLS uses the first two to carry out secure authentica-
tion in 802.IX. 
EAP-TLS support various ciphersuites on public-key encryption and 
hash functions. Figure 5.3 shows the handshake between a supplicant and 
an authentication server if RSA public-key encryption is used. 
The messages are explained in the following: 
Client hello - the list of supported ciphersuites and a 28-byte random num-
ber c. 
Server hello - the chosen ciphersuites and a 28-byte random number s. 
Server cert - the certificate of the authentication server. 
Client cert request - if the AS does not have a local cache on the supplicant, 
it will request the certificate of the supplicant. 
Server done - an empty message. 
Client cert - the certificate of the supplicant. 
Client key exchange - a 48 byte pre-master secret p encrypted by RSA 
encryption using server's public key obtained in the certificate. 
Client verify - signature of previous handshake message sent or received, 
signed by the supplicant's private key. 
Change cipher spec - indication about the change of the ciphersuite, from 
RSA to a symmetric-key algorithm. 
TLS-Finished - hash of previous handshake messages. 
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Supplicant A S 
^ TLS-Start  
Client hello, c ^ 
^ Server hello, s  
^ Server cert, ce/ta?  
^ [Client cert request]  
^ Server done  
[Client cert]. certr-M r^* ^ 
Client key exchange. R S A — r P i < { D � ^ 
Cert verify, sia�一 ^ 
Change cipher spec ^ 
TLS-Finished ^ 
4 Change cipher spec  
^ TLS-Finished  
Figure 5.3: EAP-TLS handshake for successful authentication. Messages enclosed by 
，，[]，，are optional. 
EAP-TLS supports mutual authentication through the use of certificates. 
If RSA is used, the supplicant is authenticated by the signature signed with 
its private key, while the authentication server is authenticated by the ability 
to decrypt the encrypted pre-master secret and create valid MACs using the 
information of the recovered secret. EAP-TLS also support static Diffie-
Hellman key exchange, where both parties are authenticated by the the 
ability to create valid MACs using the agreed key. 
EAP-TLS resists most known attacked, including replay and man-in-the-
middle attacks. It has good extensibility due to the flexibility on choosing 
ciphersuites. It can derive a per-session key between the authentication 
server and the supplicant, through the RSA-based key transport or DH key 
exchange. TLS is well understood and well tested and is considered as a 
secure protocol. 
There are some disadvantages on EAP-TLS, though. It requires the 
deployment of PKI. It suffers from bandwidth inefficiency because of the 
transmission of certificates. Verification on the validity of the certificates 
requires computation load in real-time. Last but not least, if RSA-based 
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key transport is used, compromise of the server's private key allow attackers 
to obtain all session keys. In other words, it violates forwary secrecy. 
5.5.3 Other Popular U L A Protocols 
Kerberos 
Kerberos is an symmetric-key based authentication protocol designed for 
IP networks. Many places that use wired LAN already use Kerberos for 
authenticating its clients for services, such as access to an email server. 
In the Kerberos model, every service requires a ticket and a session key. 
The tickets and the session keys are issued by the Kerberos authentication 
server and its ticket granting server (TGS). Each ticket contains information, 
including server's identity, client's identity, client's IP address, valid period 
of the ticket, and the session key, so that the server controlling the service 
can verify the identity of the possessor of the ticket. 
When Kerberos is applied to RSN, the authenticator (access point) acts 
as a Kerberos Proxy relaying messages from the supplicant to the Kerberos 
AS and the TGS. When an supplicant requests for network access, the AS 
issues a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and a corresponding session key, 
encrypted with the secret key shared between the supplicant and the AS, to 
the supplicant. The supplicant makes use of the TGT and the session key 
to obtain a network access service ticket and the corresponding session key 
from the TGS for accessing the network. The supplicant then presents the 
service ticket in order to obtain network access. 
Kerberos is well-tested as it has been invented for a long time. There are 
two major shortcoming on the system. It is a symmetric-key protocol and 
thus distribution of secret keys requires secure channels. Another problem 
is that the encrypted session keys make the system vulnerable to dictionary 
attack. 
PEAP 
The development of PEAP is motivated by the fact that the EAP-Response/Identity 
and EAP-Success /Failure messages are unprotected. An attacker can learn 
the identity of the user attempting to connect. Also he can spoof the Success 
and Failure messages. 
PEAP solves these problems by carrying out authentication in two phases, 
In the first phase, EAP-TLS is used in a conventional way to establish a se-
cure connection except that only the server is authenticated in this phase. 
In the second phase, the secure connection established is used for another 
complete EAP negotiation in which full authentication is performed. 
The weakness of PEAP is that number of handshake message is double 
of that in unprotected EAP-TLS. This means that the extent of inefficiency 
is also doubled. 
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LEAP 
LEAP, developed by Cisco, is the first commercial use of IEEE 802.IX for 
WLANs. It uses WEP for the message protection during the authentica-
tion. It provides mutual authentication through separate challenge-response 
mechanism in both directions. The challenge message is a random number 
while the response is the encrypted challenge. A session key is derived 
through an unpublished proprietary mechanism using the information from 
the challenge messages. 
LEAP is symmetric-key based suffering key management problem and 
the encrypted challenge messages allow any attacker to carry out offline 
dictionary attack. 
EAP-SRP 
The Secure Remote Protocol (SRP) [61] is a type of symmetric-key protocols 
based on the use of passwords. Its key derivation is based on Diffie-Hellman 
key exchange, and the user password is hidden in a exponent of the DH key 
exchange parameter. It provides mutual authentication through the explicit 
key authentication. If both the supplicant and the AS agree on the same 
session key, they are mutually authenticated. 
While the use of password can somehow simplify the key entry process at 
client side, secure channel to update the password is still required. Entropy 
of passwords is also much smaller than that of numerical keys. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 6 
Proposed IEEE 802.Hi 
Authentication Scheme 
6.1 Proposed Protocol 
6.1.1 Overview 
The proposed entity authentication scheme is a secure EAP method designed 
for authentication phase of the IEEE 802.IX framework using identity-based 
cryptography, avoiding involvement of PKI. It makes use of both symmetric-
key and public-key cryptography to solve the key management problem in 
symmetric-key only systems. The scheme basically consists of two parts: 
the AUTHENTICATE and the RECONNECT protocols. The former is run 
when a supplicant joins the network in the first time, or want to creates 
a new communication session, in case the old session key is expired or the 
supplicant switch to another authenticator connected to a different authen-
tication server. The latter allows the supplicant to resume the previous 
session and derive a new session key. 
The AUTHENTICATE protocol makes use of Au and Wei.'s identifica-
tion scheme (Section 3.8.2) in both directions of authentication, i.e. from 
supplicant to AS and from AS to supplicant. By inserting Diffie-Hellman 
(DH) key exchange parameters into the challenge messages, the protocol 
allows both parties to derive a session key (PMK), which is used in IEEE 
802.Hi key hierarchy for pairwise communication, and session information 
including a session secret and a timestamp for the RECONNECT protocol. 
The RECONNECT protocol makes use of session information created 
in the AUTHENTICATE protocol and stored in both supplicant and au-
thentication server to provide mutual authentication through symmetric-key 
cryptography. New session key is derived from the session information, as 
well as fresh nonces exchanged. It is a lightweight protocol providing fast 
reconnect characteristic. 
The proposed scheme overcomes several weaknesses of identity-based 
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cryptography. The introduction of the RECONNECT protocol and avoid-
ance of bilinear pairing techniques in the AUTHENTICATE protocol in-
creases the efficiency. The scheme makes use of many cryptographic stan-
dards, such as those published in RFC, so that compatibility is not a big 
problem. Lastly, the key derivation process in the scheme provides for-
ward secrecy so that compromising the PKG's master key does not allow 
an adversary to break the encryption after the authentication offered by the 
proposed scheme. 
Terminology 
The following describes various variables, functions and standards used in 
the proposed scheme. They will be referenced frequently in later sections. 
N - RSA modulus [38] selected by the PKG, typically 1024-bit 
g - Public generator of subgroup of quadratic residue of N^, denoted as 
typically iV + 1 (1024-bit) selected by the PKG 
p - Prime number selected by the authentication server, typically 3072-bit 
h - Generator of subgroup of Zp selected by the authentication server, typ-
ically of value 2 
IDc, IDa - Identities of the supplicant and the authentication server re-
spectively. Typically, the identities should follow the RFC2486 net-
work access identifier (NAI) [1] grammar. Special strings may be ap-
pended for special purposes. 
< XcVc >? < Xa,ya > _ Private keys of the supplicant and the authenti-
cation server respectively, where Xc,Xa E Zn and yc,ya ^ Q^n are 
typically 1024-bit integers 
rc, Uc - Random integers in Zn generated by the supplicant, typically 1024-
bit 
Va, Ua - Random integers in Zn generated by the server, typically 1024-bit 
a, b - Random 256-bit integers in Zp generated by the server and the sup-
plicant respectively 
u, V - Random 256-bit nonce integers generated by the server and the sup-
plicant respectively 
w - Timestamp generated by the AS in date format defined in RFC3339 
34] 
- Old timestamp received in the last authentication execution, and stored 
in the supplicant 
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Tw, Tu,' - Reception time of w and w' respectively 
D - Random 16-bit device ID generated by the supplicant for distinguishing 
different devices of the same client 
K - Master Session Key (MSK), or simply session key derived in the au-
thentication process by the both parties 
K' - Session secret derived via the AUTHENTICATE protocol by the both 
parties 
H{X) - One-way hashing function computed over message X 
Hy{X) - One-way hashing function computed over message with output in 
Zy 
Hy{X) - One-way hashing function computed over message X with output 
in QMy2 
PRF(X, y, Z, len) - Pseudorandom Function defined in IEEE 802.11i stan-
dard, computed using secret X, identifier Y, and seed Z, with /en-bit 
output 
H M A C x ( Y ) - RFC2104 Keyed Message Authentication Code [37] com-
puted over message Y with symmetric key X. HMAC with more than 
one input are computed by concatenating the specified values in the 
specified order. 
Architecture 
The infrastructure network in which our protocol applies follows the RSN 
architecture described in Section 5.1. Supplicant (client) asks authenti-
cator (access point) for access of the network while authentication server 
makes the decision based on the conversation between the supplicant and 
the server forwarded by the authenticator. Besides carrying out authen-
tication process, the server has to maintain storage of a list of identities 
authenticated and their corresponding session information. Supplicants and 
authentication server obtain private keys from the same PKG and thus a 
PKG should be maintained by the organization. Figure 6.1 shows an exam-
ple of the WLAN security architecture. 
Design principles 
The design of the proposed scheme is relied on several properties of RSN. 
• EAP-Request/Response messages are sent in pairs. Therefore, a pro-
tocol with odd number of rounds has overhead of one more empty 
message transmission. 
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Figure 6.1: WLAN security architecture with proposed protocol implemented. A number 
of supplicants connect to an access point simultaneously while several access points connect 
to an authentication server through wired LAN. One enterprise may have more than one 
server. 
• The AS in most cases maintains or connects to a database storing client 
information, such as an LDAP server, for purposes of authorization 
and accounting. This database can be used to maintain client's session 
attributes of each communication session. 
• The backend AS is protected by high level of security against attack-
ers from accessing through physical means or through the network. 
Directly attacking the server is not easier than attacking on network 
communication. 
Preparation 
When PKG is set up, it chooses N and g. Supplicants and authentication 
servers should have their identities (usually NAI) and corresponding private 
keys obtained from the same PKG before the authentication. The PKG 
extracts a private key < x,y > oi identity ID by computing {x,y) G ( Z " x 
QM^) such that g工yN = Hn{ID) (mod N � . The identities of the server 
and the public parameters N and g defined by the PKG for extracting 
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private keys should be available to the public and the supplicants should be 
aware of the identities of legitimated servers in the organization. 
The server optionally maintains information of legitimate supplicants 
and if so, the server should be aware of the revocation of keys of the suppli-
cants. The server and the supplicant both have a system clock for timing. 
The time of them may not be synchronized but the counting of time should 
have a adequate accuracy. The clock built in the BIOS of any nowadays 
computer is good enough for the proposed scheme. 
Lastly, the server should be able to store the session secret corresponding 
to all authenticated supplicants. It should keep track on the date of the 
creation. If the life of the secret, depending on its effective strength, exceeds 
a preset value, the server should remove such information. 
Hash functions 
The hash function H is selected by the authentication server. It is used to 
construct HY and H. Denoting LY the length of Y in bit, Ih the length of 
the output of H{X), we construct Hy{X) as follows: 
1. Recursively compute A{i) 二 丑 — 1) || X) where A(0) = H{X) 
and output a value A = A{0) || A( l ) || ... || A{\Iy/Ih])- Truncate A 
to length ly to obtain A'. 
2. Recursively compute B{i) 二 H{B{i - 1)) where B{0) = A' until B(i) 
falls within the range (0, 2 … - ( 2 … m o d Y) — 1). Denote such B(i) 
be B'. 
3. HriX) = B' mod Y. 
To compute we have to make use of Hy^ defined above as fol-
lows: 
1. Recursively compute F{I) 二 — 1)) where F(0) = HY^^X) 
until Jacobi Symbol of F{i) is equal to 1. 
2. Output such F{i) as Hy{X) 
Since the computation of H{X) requires relatively high computational 
load, the supplicant and the authentication server can decide to store the 
hash values of identities so as to increase performance. 
6.1.2 The A U T H E N T I C A T E Protocol 
According to 802.IX framework described in Section 5.2，AUTHENTICATE 
protocol handshake and payload content transmitted in each step are shown 
below. Note that ” # ” is used in the EAP-type field as a new value of 
the field is allocated by Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (lANA) for 
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any new EAP protocol and so we are not able to determine the value now. 
Denote [X] the value of the content field X received or sent, {Y} the packet 
Y including header used to creating the HMAC, excluding the HMAC field 
itself. 
• II: Supplicant — AS: EAP-Request/Identity 
• 12: Supplicant AS: EAP-Response/Identity 
- 1 2 . 1 : IDc 
• Al : Supplicant — AS: EAP-Request/EAP-type=# 
一 Al . l： IDa 
- A 1 . 2 : H ( g � 2 mod N^) 
• A2: Supplicant AS: EAP-Response/EAP-type=# 
- A 2 . 1 : mod N^) 
- A 2 . 2 : ha mod p 
一 A2.3: D 
• A3: Supplicant — AS: EAP-Request/EAP-type=# 
—A3.1: ra — Hjv([A2.2])xa ( mod TV if " = iV + 1) 
- A 3 . 2 : mod N 
- A 3 . 3 : hb mod p 
A3.4: w 
—A3.5: HMACK'(U2}, {A1}, {A2}, {A3}) 
A4: Supplicant — AS: EAP-Response/EAP-type=# 
— A 4 . 1 : re 一 i?Ar([A3.3])xc ( mod TV if ^ = AT + i ) 
- A 4 . 2 : [A3.3] mod N 
—A4.3: HMACK' ( { /2 } , { A l } , {A2}, {A3}, {^4 } ) 
The Master Session Key (MSK), Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) 
and the session secret are derived by the supplicant and the authentica-
tion server after they receive A3 and A2 packet respectively. Both MSK 
and EMSK are 128 bits and the pairwise master key (PMK) used in RSN 
is formed by the MSK appended with the EMSK. They are computed as 
follows: 
• K, = mod N, "Session S e c r e t " , m o d N, 128) 
• K = FRF{K', "Master Session mod N, 128) 
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• EMSK = PRF(ir,"Extended Master Session mod N, 128) 
Verification must be carried out by both supplicant and authentication 
server. If the verification fails, the verifier should send an EAP-Failure 
message and disconnect. Otherwise, an EAP-Success message is sent at the 
end of the authentication. The verification on each step of the way after the 
listed message is received is as follows: 
• 12: Server 
The server optionally checks the identity of the supplicant against the 
legitimated supplicant list allowed to access the network if such list 
exists. 
• Al : Supplicant 
The supplicant verifies that the received server identity ([Al.l]) is 
legitimated. 
• A3: Supplicant 
The supplicant verifies that: 
[A1.2] = ((应iv([Al.l]))丑凡([A2-2])p[A3.I]([A3.2])W mod 
Also the supplicant checks the validity of the HMAC value ([A3.5]). 
• A4: Server 
The server verifies that: 
[A2.1]=丑((应iv(p2.1]))丑"([aM)p[A4.i]([A4.2])w mod N � 
Also the server checks the validity of the HMAC value ([A4.3]). 
Message II and 12 are EAP Request and Response identity messages 
required in any IEEE 802.Hi authentication protocol. Message Al , A2, A3 
contain commitment, challenge and response messages respectively of Au 
and Wei.'s identification scheme, to allow the supplicant to authenticate the 
server. Message A2, A3, A4 do the same job in reverse direction and thus 
two directions of authentication are overlapped. The challenge messages 
encapsulate DH parameters. DH key exchange is used to ensure the forward 
secrecy of the session key. 
Message A3 contains a timestamp indicating the sent time of the mes-
sage. When received, the timestamp is stored in the supplicant together 
with its reception time T^. Message A3 and A4 contain HMAC of previous 
messages in order to provide integrity. Shared secret value obtained from 
DH key exchange is used to calculate the session key and session secret. 
The session key is used as the PMK which is required to be 256-bit. The 
session secret is stored by both parties. At the server, session secrets are 
distinguished by ID�and D. A simplified view of the protocol is shown in 
Figure 6.2. 
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Supplicant Server 
P u b l i c : IDc,g,N Pub l i c : I D a . g . N 
Secret : Xc^Vc S e c r e t :工 
r a n d o m , Ua 
check I D a 
r a n d o m / c, b 
rai idoiu a 
k = d： 
t imes t a m p iv 
rr / 1 \ - —H,\{da) 
Za = Ta — HN�(laVra* : « = , 
w , 4 二 h �, HMACA-
k 二 4 
veri fy H M A C , 
二丑 ( Q ， (二 “ W a , 
where Qa = 
Zc 二 /�c — HN((Ic�XC’ 
4 二 严 ⑷ , H M A C V 
"“ ^ verify HIM A C . 
where 二 Hn(IDc) 
Figure 6.2: Simplified view of the AUTHENTICATE protocol message flow. Moduli of 
the arithmetic are not shown. HMAC means the HMAC value of previous messages. 
6.1.3 The R E C O N N E C T Protocol 
The RECONNECT protocol is a simple nonce-based authentication relied 
on the shared session secret K' and the stored timestamp w'. It can simplify 
the authentication process by reducing the handshake to only two moves. 
The message flow of the protocol is as follows: 
• II： Supplicant — AS: EAP-Request/Identity 
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• 12: Supplicant 一 AS: EAP-Response/Identity 
—12.1: IDc 
• Rl : Supplicant — AS: EAP-Reqiiest/EAP-type=# 
—Rl.l: IDa 
一 R1.2: u 
—R1.3: w 
- R 1 . 4 : H M A C x ' { / 2 } , { m } ) 
• R2: Supplicant — AS: EAP-Respoiise/EAP-type=# 
- R 2 . 1 : V 
- R 2 . 2 : D 
- R 2 . 2 : HMACK/ ( { /2 } , { i ? l } , { i ?2 } ) 
The new MSK and EMSK are derived by the supplicant and the authen-
tication server based on the session secret K' after they receive R1 and R2 
packet respectively. They are computed as follows: 
• K = PRF(ir，"Master Session Key，，，収|卜，128) 
• EMSK = PRF(K',"Extended Master Session Key",w||v, 128) 
Verification requirements of the RECONNECT protocol are shown be-
low. 
• 12: Server 
The server optionally checks the identity of the supplicant against the 
legitimate supplicant list. 
• Rl : Supplicant 
The supplicant verifies that the received server identity ([Al.l]) is 
legitimated and checks the validity of the HMAC value ([R1.4]) using 
the stored session secret. Also it checks whether the time difference 
between (w - w') and (T切—T^/) lies within a reasonable range (the 
acceptance window), which is determined by the network latency. 
• R2: Server 
The server checks the validity of the HMAC value ([R2.2]) using the 
stored session secret corresponding to the supplicant. 
The server can find out whether the supplicant has an old session by 
searching its session secret. For supplicants with old session, it decides to 
run the RECONNECT protocol because the session secret has not expired. 
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The supplicant learns the type of the protocol executed in the first EAP-
Request message. If the supplicant considers the old session insecure, it can 
explicitly trigger the execution of the RECONNECT protocol by responding 
an empty message to server. HMAC values created with old session secret 
on previous messages are used to prove the knowledge on the session secret 
since only valid parties know the old session secret. New session key are 
created based on the session secret, and the nonces exchanged. The new 
timestamp is stored in the supplicant, replacing the old one. A simplified 
view of the RECONNECT protocol is shown in Figure 6.3. 
Supplicant Server 
Public: w. Public: IDa 
Secret: K' Secret: K丨 
random u 
timestamp w 
瓜 , " , w，, H M A C a � 
check IDa 
verify HMAC 
verify tiniest amp difference 
random v ^ tttv r � , 
IK D. HMAC A', 
‘ " verify HMAC 
Figure 6.3: Simplified view of the RECONNECT protocol message flow. Exponential 
operations are in module p. HMAC means the HMAC value of previous messages 
6.1.4 Packet Format 
In this section, the packet format and content for the protocol messages 
are specified. Packets of the proposed protocol have the following structure 
(Figure 6.4): 
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Bit offset — 
0 1 2 3 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
Code Identifier Length  
Type Message Type Flagg | HMAC ID 
DH Group Hash ID Payload. 
Figure 6.4: Header structure of proposed protocol packets. Total length of the header 
is 9 bytes. The Code, Identifier, Length and Type fields are EAP header fields defined in 
RFC3748 [2]. 
Code 
This field specifies the message type of EAP: 
0x01 - EAP-Request 
0x02 - EAP-Response 
0x03 - EAP-Success 
0x04 - EAP-Failure 
Identifier 
For matching Responses with Requests. The Identifier must be changed for 
each new Request message sent and must not be changed in retransmission 
of a given message. The Identifier in the Response message must match the 
corresponding Request message. 
Length 
For indicating the packet length including the header and payload. 
Type 
A new number of EAP type for this protocol is required as discussed before. 
EAP-Request /Identity and EAP-Response/Identity messages are of type 1. 
Message Type 
This field specifies the message type of the proposed protocol defined in 
Section 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 as follows: 
0x01 - A 1 
0x02 - A 2 
0x03 - A3 
0x04 - A4 
0x05 - R 1 
CHAPTER 6. PROPOSED IEEE 802.111 AUTHENTICATION SCHEME63 
0x06 - R2 
0x07 - R3, empty EAP-Response message indicating that the supplicant 
refuses to execute the RECONNECT protocol 
Flags 
The flags field is broken up into 8 bits while each represents a binary flag. 
The field is defined as the logical OR or the following values: 
• 0x01 - F-flag: The flag is set on all but the last fragment in a series of 
fragmented message packet. 
• 0x02 - D-flag: The flag indicates that delegated guest access is enabled 
(see Section 6.1.6) 
• 0x04 - P-flag: The flag indicates that pseudonym is allowed, (see 
Section 6.1.7) 
• 0x08 to 0x80 - Reserved 
H M A C ID 
The field specifies the algorithm or the hash to implement the HMAC. Each 
bit represents one algorithm. Below is the recommended setting: 
• 0x01 - HMAC-SHA-256 [22 
DH Group 
The field specifies the Diffie-Hellman Group used in the AUTHENTICATE 
protocol. Each bit represents one group. For DH group, the following is 
recommended: 
• 0x01 - 3072-bit MODP Group [33 
Hash ID 
The field specifies the hash function used in the AUTHENTICATE protocol. 
Each bit represents one function. For the hash function to be secure, the 
following is recommended: 
• 0x01 - SHA-256 [22: 
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Byte offset 一 
0 1 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 
leii Value ... 
Figure 6.5: Structure of each payload value. The actual value is in variable length and 
the Len field specifies its length. 
Payload 
Payload field contains the actual handshake contents. The values and order 
of concatenation are defined in Section 6.1.2 and 6.1.3. For each value , a 
two-byte length field is appended at the beginning. Figure 6.5 shows the 
structure of each value. 
All integer values are transmitted in network-byte order, with the most 
significant byte first. Strings, such as identities, are transmitted using 8-
bit ASCII characters without null-termination. Binary data, such as hash 
outputs, are transmitted as-is. 
6.1.5 Ciphersuites Negotiation 
Ciphersuites negotiation is supported in the proposed scheme. This allows 
extensibility and flexibility on choosing different ciphersuites. Even if one 
ciphersuite is broken, a network administrator can change the security policy 
and disable the support on that ciphersuite. 
The ciphersuites includes the DH group and the hash function used in 
the AUTHENTICATE protocol and the HMAC algorithm in both of the 
protocols. The AS indicates the supported ciphersuites in the first message 
(A1 or R l ) by XORing different values representing the ciphersuites. The 
supplicant learns the supported ciphersuites, makes choices of its own and 
responses in the second message (A2 and R2) by setting the bit on each 
ciphersuite representing its choice. The ciphersuites specified at the second 
message should remain unchanged in successive messages. 
6.1.6 Delegation 
Delegation is an attractive feature which can lift the burden from the net-
work administrator by allowing a valid client (the delegate) to authorized 
guests to access the WLAN. With identity-based cryptography, the right of 
delegation can be directly added to the identity, namely public key of an 
delegate. Meanwhile, the delegate can make a decision to authorize a guest 
by simply reading his identity. 
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Overview on the mechanism 
To allow the authentication server to authenticate and authorize a guest, 
the guest must obtain a credential from the delegate and present it during 
the authentication process. The credential in our protocol is a digital sig-
nature from the delegate. The delegate signs on information including the 
guest's identity, public parameters of the PKG generating the private key 
to the guest, expiry date and guest type, using the identity-based signature 
scheme constructed from Au and Wei.'s identification scheme. Because of 
the similarities between Au and Wei.'s identification and signature scheme, 
software implementation can be shared in both schemes. 
Preparation 
Since in most cases, the guest and the delegate are in different organizations 
and their PKGs are different, enough information should be presented to the 
authentication server in order to compute valid messages during authenti-
cation. In order to get the credential from the delegate, the guest should 
have the following available: 
IDg - The guest's identity 
Ng - RSA modulus [38] selected by the guest's PKG 
Qg - Public generator of subgroup of QRn^ selected by the guest's PKG 
< Xg.yg > - Private key of the guest 
If the guest does not have the above data, for example, his organization 
does not deploy the proposed system, the delegate has to act as a PKG to 
generate the private key for him. 
For a local user to obtain the delegation right, he has to ask the lo-
cal PKG to generate a private key corresponding to the public key IDd || 
delegate 二 1 where IDd is his identity. In another words, the delegation 
right is specified in the public key and the local user has to ask for the se-
cret key to carry out delegation process. The PKG must ensure that users 
without delegation right do not obtain a private key corresponding to an 
identity containing “ delegate = 1". 
Obtaining Credential 
The guest presents IDg, Ng and Qg to the delegate who checks the validity 
of the data. As values of Ng and gg depend on the organization the guest 
belongs to, it is the responsibility of the delegate to obtain the corresponding 
data from the organization. Then the delegate signs on the following data 
using the signature scheme described in Section 3.8.2, with the private key 
corresponding to IDd I I delegate = 1. 
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1. g, N - Local PKG parameters 
2. IDg, Qg, Ng - Guest's parameters 
3. Texp - Expiry date of the guest access right, in date format defined in 
RFC2822 [49； 
4. Y - Guest type, which may be used in authorization stage to restrict 
guest access 
The guest obtains Te^p, Y and the signature sig from the delegate. 
D-flag 
The D-flag (Section 6.1.4) is reserved for delegation mechanism. D-flag set 
to 1 in A1 or R1 message means that the server supports delegated guest 
access. D-flag set to 1 in A2 or R2 message means that the supplicant is a 
guest. Therefore, for local user, D-flag in A2 and R2 messages is set to 0. 
Authentication 
The authentication process of the guest has the same bandwidth perfor-
mance as that of a local user. D-flag is set in every message in order to 
notice the server that the supplicant is a guest. For AUTHENTICATE pro-
tocol, according the terminology defined in Section 6.1.1 and this section, 
the following modifications on messages are made for the guest: 
• 12.1: The guest supplicant sends IDd instead 
• A2.1: The guest sends Higl'^Uc' mod N^), i.e. uses his own parame-
ters 
• A2.3 - A2.7: Extra fields - IDg, Ng, gg, Texp, Y respectively 
• A2.8: Signature obtained from the delegate, sig 
• A4.1: The guest sends Vc — i7iv“[A3.3])a:c ( mod N ii gg = Ng + 1) 
instead 
參 A4.2: The guest sends UcVc^ ^^ '^ ^ mod Ng instead 
Moreover, there is difference on verification process in the server while 
the key derivation remains unchanged: 
• A3: Server 
The server verifies the validity of the signature ([A2.8]) on the val-
ues [A2.3]-[A2.7] received. To verifier the signature, it uses delegate. 
II [12.1] as the public key so that it ensures the delegate has the ap-
propriate right. Also it checks whether the guest account has expired 
according to the expiry date in [A2.6 . 
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• A4: Server 
The server verifies that: 
[A2.1]=丑((锋a2.4]([A2.3]))丑[从4]([A3.3])([a2.5])[A4.i]([A4.2])[A2.4] mod ([A2.4])2) 
Also the server checks the validity of the HMAC value ([A4.3]). 
Supplicant Server 
Public： IDd，g•凡 Public: IDa.g.N 
IDg’gg，Ng,Tej:p,Y Secret: Xa.Va 
Secret: XcVc 
random r^, Ua 
check IDa 
random rc, Uc, b 
IDg�Qg，、g, Tgxp^ ^ ， 
发 ? d e l e g a t e = l (仏 N, IDg.Qg.Ng, T^xp, ^  ) 
verify sig 
random a 
tiniest amp w 
k = d^a 
rr / 1 \ ~ —Hf\r(da) 
Za 二 ra — H‘�r(da):ra, ^a = UaUa , 
w’ 4 = ，HMACfe 
verifv HMAC, 
where =应A T (瓜） 
知 = T c - HNg⑷工g, 
i c = Ucy:H•��,HMAC-, 
^ verify HMAC, 
tc 二 
where Qc 二 敌〜、(/^V) 
Figure 6.6: Message flow of the AUTHENTICATE protocol for a guest. Moduli of the 
arithmetic are not shown. HMAC means the HMAC value of previous messages. sigriX) 
means signature signed by public key Y on message X. 
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Figure 6.6 shows the message flow of the AUTHENTICATE protocol for 
a guest. After authenticating the guest, the server stores his identity and 
session secret in a guest list. For the RECONNECT protocol, the guest 
sends his real identity in 12 message. The server carries out the protocol 
executed by a guest just the same as that by a local user. 
6.1.7 Identity Privacy 
Our protocol supports identity privacy in the EAP layer. It is hard to pre-
vent an eavesdropper to link two authentication processes by observing the 
Media Access Control (MAC) address, a hardware address that uniquely 
identifies each node of a network, since this requires change in MAC layer 
specification, IEEE 802.11 for example. However, hiding the identity in 
the EAP layer still provide some degree of anonymity. For instance, an 
eavesdropper is not able to determine whether a client requests for authen-
tication through different computers. Therefore, identity privacy is still a 
desired property in WLAN. 
Similar to EAP SRP-SHAl [14], the identity privacy is protected by using 
pseudonym. The pseudonym is created after the supplicant authenticates 
the first time and therefore the supplicant can use the pseudonym in later-on 
authentication. But unlike EAP SRP-SHAl, our protocol does not require 
extra field in any message of authentication. 
The authentication indicates that pseudonym is allowed by setting P-flag 
to 1. After the supplicant is authenticated, either through the AUTHEN-
TICATE or the RECONNECT protocol, both supplicant and server can 
compute the pseudonym for next session as follows: 
1. Compute P = RPF(iC, ''Pseudonym'', /Dc, 128). 
2. Covert P to printable string by the algorithm described in Section 
4.3.2.4 of RFC1421 [40]. 
3. if IDc is a NAI, •realm is appended to the string obtained, where 
realm is the realm part of IDc 
Both supplicant and server stores the computed pseudonym if identity 
privacy is enabled. Next time when the supplicant requests for authenti-
cation, he presents ” pseudonym�,|| pseudonym in 12 message. The server 
recognizes the pseudonym and finds the actual identity string of the suppli-
cant for the verification part of the authentication. 
6.2 Security Considerations 
6.2.1 Security of the A U T H E N T I C A T E protocol 
The security of the AUTHENTICATE protocol is based on the security of 
Au and Wei's identification scheme, which is proven to be secure against 
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impersonation under passive, active or concurrent attack given RSA[N，N 
assumption holds in the Random Oracle Model, as described in Section 3.8.2. 
Therefore, the protocol prevents any adversary from impersonating a valid 
local user after obtaining transcripts of interactions between the local user 
and the authentication server, however the adversary has interacted with the 
server before the attempt. Securing concurrent attack allows the protocol 
defends any adversary who concurrently sets up a number of session with the 
authentication server. The server only has negligible possibility to accept 
the adversary's authentication attempt. 
Because the protocol depends on the hardness of RSA problem, the 
security of it is more or less the same as any other authentication scheme 
based on the same problem, such as EAP-TLS. However, the criteria for 
our protocol to be secure, at the same time, also include that the hash 
function used in the protocol is able to act as the role of a random oracle. 
In other words, our protocol requires that the hash function to be one-
way and collision-resistance. We recommend the use of SHA-256 function 
because of its longer output which is more secure under brute force attack. 
Although key exchange information is embedded into the challenge mes-
sage of the identification scheme, it does not affect the security of the scheme, 
given that the hash function used to calculate the actual challenge value is 
secure. This is because the output of the hash input is random and any 
adversary is not able to gain statistical information on the challenge value. 
The protocol provides explicit key authentication. Since the protocol is 
secure against impersonation, only legitimate party can pass the authenti-
cation and establish the session key. Both parties are assured that another 
possesses the key by the HMAC because only a party with the key can 
construct it if the HMAC algorithm is secure. 
The protocol is secure against key compromise impersonation. The pri-
vate key generation stage of Au and Wei.'s identification scheme is basically 
the same as Paillier's one-way trapdoor permutation scheme [48], of which 
the security is based on the RSA[N,N] assumption. Therefore the compro-
mise of long term private keys of one or more entities does not enable the 
adversary to obtain private keys of others, given that the RSA problem is 
hard. To impersonate the others without the corresponding private keys 
in the AUTHENTICATE protocol is equivalent to breaking Au and Wei.'s 
scheme. 
Finally, we recommend the use of RSA modulus of length at least 1024 
bits to provide similar security level as other commonly deployed RSA sys-
tems, such as EAP-TLS. 
6.2.2 Security of the R E C O N N E C T protocol 
The RECONNECT protocol is based on exchange of random nonces while 
key confirmation using HMAC keyed by the session secret is added. The 
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HMAC allows implicit key authentication by confirming both parties have 
the same session secret, which is only shared between the supplicant and the 
authentication server. Only the supplicant and the server can construct a 
valid HMAC value given that the hash function used in the HMAC algorithm 
acts like a random oracle. 
The HMAC values are used to authenticate the nonces and ensure that 
the values are sent by authenticated parties, which always generate fresh 
nonces. Any active or concurrent adversary cannot forge a valid HMAC 
value and thus a valid message. This allows the protocol to create a fresh 
session key in each run. 
For the RECONNECT protocol, the authentication is based on shared 
session secrets which are independent for each supplicant. Therefore, com-
promise of long term private keys and session secrets of some entities again 
does not enable the adversary to impersonate others. In other words, the 
RECONNECT protocol is resistant to key-compromise impersonation. 
The purpose to use a timestamp is to minimize the damage from replay 
attack. If the timestamp is not used, an adversary can replay the R1 message 
if the previous authentication was unsuccessful so that he can obtain a valid 
HMAC value keyed by the session secret while the session secret has not 
been modified. To achieve this, the adversary can just request for authenti-
cation by using the supplicant's identity and capture the R1 message. As a 
result, the supplicant considers the adversary a legitimate server. Since the 
adversary does not know the shared session secret, though he can authenti-
cate to the supplicant, due to the implicit key authentication property of the 
protocol, he cannot obtain the session key which is protected by the pseudo-
random function and the session secret, and used to determine other keys 
for data encryption and integrity. Therefore, the above problem is reduced 
to upper layer denial of service (DoS). The attacker cannot authenticate to 
the server since he cannot create a valid HMAC and so, he cannot set up a 
man-in-the-middle-attack. This kind of DoS is always possible because an 
attacker can always modify packets so the server does not authenticate the 
supplicant. 
The use of timestamp can further minimize effect of the DoS attack. 
Since timestamps sent by the server change time by time and each of them 
is only valid for a very short period of time. This means even if an attacker 
captures the timestamp and the corresponding HMAC, he has to use it with 
a short range of time. 
6.2.3 Security of Key Derivation 
Session keys axe derived using the PRF defined in IEEE 802.11i and fresh en-
tropy supplied by both the supplicant and the authentication server through 
Diffie-HeUman key exchange in the AUTHENTICATE and through ex-
change of nonces in the RECONNECT protocol. To successfully recover 
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a session key, a passive adversary either solves the DH problem or inverts 
the HMAC algorithm used in the AUTHENTICATE protocol or compro-
mising the session secret used in the RECONNECT protocol. Therefore the 
hash function adopted in the HMAC algorithm is required to be secure and 
a high level security should be applied to protect the server. The character-
istics of the derived key, the reason to use DH key exchange and the security 
of the long-term private key are elaborated in the following subsections. 
Key Strength 
The PMK (MSK || EMSK) generated in our proposed protocol is 256 bits, 
which is the basic requirement of IEEE 802.11i. In the AUTHENTICATE 
protocol, the key generation is protected by DH key exchanged. In the RE-
CONNECT protocol, it is protected by the session secret. It is believed 
that a 3072-bit MODP public-key scheme roughly has equivalent strength 
as 130-bit symmetric-key scheme [33]. RFC5326 [33] also state that the 
� exponent used as the private DH parameter must have an entropy at least 
twice as large as the system strength. Consequently, 256-bit random DH 
exponents are used in order to allow the MSK and EMSK generated in 
the AUTHENTICATE protocol to contain 128-bit strength. On the other 
hand, the session secret, the same as the session key, has 128-bit strength. 
Therefore, the key generated in the RECONNECT protocol also has 128-bit 
strength. The PMK formed by MSK and EMSK thus has an effective key 
strength of 128 bits, which is the mandatory requirement of EAP authenti-
cation methods used in WLANs, stated in RFC4017 [58；. 
Known Key Security 
By using DH key exchange and exchange of fresh nonces, unique secret ses-
sion keys are generated in each authentication session. The DH parameters 
and the nonces are generated randomly and independent in each session. In 
addition, if the PRF and the HMAC is secure enough, the attacker knowing 
the session key of a client at some time cannot know previous or later-on ses-
sion keys of him, because he cannot find the session secret from the HMAC. 
Therefore, knowledge of one session key does not allow deduction of the 
session key in another session. 
Forward Secrecy 
If long-term private keys of one or more of the entities obtained from the 
PKG are compromised, the secrecy of previously established session keys is 
not affected. This is because the private keys are only used in entity authen-
tication of supplicants and authentication servers in the AUTHENTICATE 
protocol. The session key is derived from DH key exchange which is in-
dependently to the entity authentication, because unlike some other EAP 
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methods, such as RSA-based EAP-TLS, nonce values are not encrypted by 
the long-term private keys. Even if the secret of the PKG is corrupted, the 
previous sessions keys are still safe since only private keys of the entities can 
be computed from the PKG's secret. 
Unknown Key-share resilience 
To carry out unknown key-share attack, In the AUTHENTICATE protocol, 
an adversary has to replace any ephemeral DH key exchange value exchanged 
with his own one. The value, after being hashed, is used as a challenge that 
a server or a supplicant has to appropriately response. If the adversary 
modifies the value, verification will not succeed unless he can find out a 
collision on the hash output. In the RECONNECT protocol, the nonces are 
protected by the HMACs. It is infeasible for the adversary to transmit his 
own value while providing a valid HMAC if the hash function used in the 
HMAC algorithm is secure. 
Key Control 
Because both parties have an input into the session key, neither entity is able 
to force the full session key to be a preselected value. However, the receiver 
of the first ephemeral DH key exchange value or nonces exchanged (the 
server and the supplicant in AUTHENTICATE and RECONNECT protocol 
respectively) can set certain bits of the agreed session key by evaluating the 
result for different choices of the exponent of the reply. However, it does 
not appear possible for the party to set any substantial number of bits in a 
reasonable time frame. 
6.2.4 E A P Security Claims and E A P Methods Requirements 
This section describes our purposed protocol in terms of specific security 
terminology as required by RFC3748 [2], as well as additional EAP meth-
ods requirements in WLAN, mentioned in RFC4017 [58]. We demonstrate 
that our proposed protocol fulfills most requirements to be a secure EAP 
method. The weakness of our protocol is inability to provide EAP level DoS 
resistance, but one should notice that none of the EAP methods so far can 
defend such kind of attack. 
Protected Ciphersuite Negotiation 
In the first message from the server (Al, Rl) , the server specifies the cipher-
suite in the packet header, including DH group, hash function and HMAC 
algorithm, as described in Section 6.1.4. The server is in total control of 
the ciphersuite supported, thus a client not supporting the specified cipher-
suite will not be able to authenticate. The server can choose the list of 
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ciphersuites it considers secure, and therefore a centralized security policy 
on ciphersuites can be adopted. 
The ciphersuite flags are located in the header and protected by the 
HMACs in A3, A4, R1 and R2 messages. The flags values in A3 and A4 
must be the same as that in A2. Therefore, an attacker cannot modify the 
flag values in order to force the parties to choose weaker ciphersuites. 
Mutual Authentication 
The AUTHENTICATE protocol carries out Au and Wei.'s identification 
scheme in both directions and thus authenticate both the supplicant and the 
server. Consequently, the protocol achieves explicit mutual authentication. 
That means only valid parties can pass the verification of the authentication. 
On the other hand, when RECONNECT protocol is used, only the client 
is explicitly authenticated. Since an adversary can continuously request for 
the R1 messages with different timestamp until the client attempts to con-
nect to the WLAN, the server is not explicitly authenticated as the adver-
sary can also pass the verification in supplicant's side. However, the server 
is instead implicitly authenticated to the supplicant because only the server 
containing the session secret, derived from the AUTHENTICATE protocol, 
which explicitly authenticates the server, is able to generate the required 
session keys. The supplicant can verify the server's authenticity during the 
four-way handshake. 
Integrity Protection 
The payload and headers in A l and A2 messages of the proposed scheme 
are not explicitly covered by an integrity protection field. This is because no 
key is available to generate a HMAC. However, since HMAC values in A3 
and A4 are computed according to the information including A l and A2, 
the messages are also protected. All HMAC values in the RECONNECT 
protocol cover the header and the payload since the session secret is available 
before the execution of the protocol. 
Replay Protection 
The only messages capable of being replayed are A l and R1 because other 
messages involve knowledge on previous messages. Impacts of replaying R1 
message are explained in previous sections. Replaying Al message, which is 
the commitment of the identification scheme, does not enable the adversary 
to response to the random challenge from the supplicant. Therefore in both 
cases, replaying theses messages provides an attacker with only a negligible 
advantage and only leads to DoS. 
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Confidentiality 
Our protocol does not provide encryption, thus confidentiality to EAP mes-
sages. However, one should note that this does not affect the security of our 
scheme and in fact, confidentiality is not required in WLAN environment 
58:. 
Key Derivation and Key Strength 
Our scheme generates 128-bit MSK and EMSK which are combined to form 
a 256-bit PMK. The security on the keys are discussed in previous sections. 
Dictionary Attack Resistance 
Our scheme is resistant to dictionary attacks because no short password or 
key is used in created HMAC or in generation of keys by PRF. The keys 
(including session key and session secret) used in both algorithms are 128 
bits and continuously change in each authentication execution. An attacker 
cannot obtain the keys in a reasonable amount of time. 
Fast Reconnect 
While a specific fast reconnect ion option is not included, execution of the 
RECONNECT protocol requires only minimal effort to authenticate a sup-
plicant connected before. The protocol requires only string concatenation 
and HMAC calculation so as to identify both parties. It is a two-move proto-
col (EAP-Request/Idenity and EAP-Response/Identity are excluded as they 
are mandatory for all EAP methods in IEEE 802.IX), saving bandwidth and 
avoiding header overhead. 
Session Independence 
Session keys are independently generated for each session corresponding to 
fresh entropy. Generation of session keys in the RECONNECT protocol only 
depends on the session secret. We shows the forward secrecy and known key 
security of our protocol in previous sections. Even if an adversary obtains 
a session key, he cannot find out other session keys in previous or later-on 
sessions. Thus the damage is limited to the session compromised. 
If an adversary compromises the session secret generated from the AU-
THENTICATE protocol of a supplicant, he can compute later-on session 
keys. However since the session secret is only used in the stage of authen-
tication, compromising the session secret is much harder than that on the 
session key. Therefore, compromise of the session key in one session does 
not allow an attacker to impersonate in another session. However, if the 
adversary only obtains the session key, he cannot find out the corresponding 
session secret due to the use of secure one-way PRF. 
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The session independence property facilitates the use of group identity. 
One user in the group cannot obtain the key generated by another user of 
the group. This maintains security of each user in the group. 
Fragmentation 
Fragmentation and reassembly are supported through the fragmentation flag 
in the header, although typically, size of any packet in our protocol is not 
larger than the EAP minimum transmission unit (MTU), which is assumed 
to be 1020 bytes. 
Channel Binding 
Our protocol does not explicitly include any channel binding. Channel Bind-
ing is only an optional feature suggested in RFC4017 [58] and the lack of it 
does not affect the overall security of our scheme. 
Shared State Equivalence 
After the supplicant and the authentication server successfully complete our 
EAP method, the shared EAP method state in both sides are equivalent. 
The EAP method state attributes include session key (MSK and EMSK), 
session secret, method version (obtained from Message Type field) and ci-
phersuite used. Both parties are able to distinguish this instance of the 
protocol from the other instances through the identity obtained from the 
communicated party. 
Protection against Man-in-the-middle Attacks 
Referring to the discussion of the integrity protection of our scheme, one 
should be aware that the ability of an adversary to modify messages does 
not allow him to get any advantage except to carry out DoS attack. A man-
in-the-middle cannot either pass the verification or obtain the key derived 
in the attacked session in order to carry out further actions. 
End-user Identity Hiding 
End-user identity hiding is achieved by using pseudonym in our scheme 
as described in Section 6.1.7. The protection is limited to the peer-name 
portion of a NAI because the realm portion may be used for routing the EAP 
request of the supplicant to appropriate back-end authentication server. 
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6.3 Efficiency Analysis 
6.3.1 Overview 
Efficiency is another important concern for an EAP method, besides se-
curity. Only methods with good efficiency are practical to deploy in real 
life. Efficiency is involved in two areas: bandwidth and computation speed. 
As bandwidth in WLAN environment is limited, an authentication session 
should occupy as less bandwidth as possible. An EAP method with high 
computation speed allows a faster authentication process, especially for low-
end devices such as PDAs. The following sections analyzes the efficiency of 
our EAP method. Comparisons are made between our scheme and EAP-
TLS which is the most widely adopted method at this moment. 
6.3.2 Bandwidth Performance 
The bandwidth in an authentication process between a supplicant and a 
authentication server is mainly occupied by the response values of Au and 
Wei.'s identification scheme in messages A3, A4 and the DH values ex-
changed in A2, A3, R1 and R2. In order to provide sufficient security, size 
of the RSA modulus of the PKG and the prime for DH key exchange has to 
be large enough and thus modular arithmetic results are significant in size. 
This is in fact a drawback to use public-key cryptography. 
Table 6.1 is a comparison of payload size between the AUTHENTICATE 
of our scheme and EAP-TLS, which also utilized public-key cryptography. It 
demonstrates that the AUTHENTICATE protocol occupies less bandwidth 
than EAP-TLS. The major reason is that our scheme does not require the 
use of certificate which has a large size. The RECONNECT protocol further 
reduces the total packet size to about 150 bytes. 
In addition, the AUTHENTICATE protocol contains only 4 moves and 
the RECONNECT protocol contains only 2 moves while the EAP-TLS 
method requires 6 moves. Our scheme, therefore, has less overhead than 
EAP-TLS on packet header and connection setup. 
6.3.3 Computation Speed 
In the proposed protocol, the computation of modular exponentiation dom-
inates in the computation time. Computation of all messages sent by sup-
plicant or server, as well as the verification, requires such kind of arithmetic. 
Fortunately, many algorithm has been developed so as to increase the speed 
of the computation, such as those surveyed in [28 . 
Table 6.2 roughly shows the difference in computation of modular ex-
ponentiation between the AUTHENTICATION Protocol and EAP-TLS. If 
square-and-multiply method is used to calculation the exponentiation, the 
CHAPTER 6. PROPOSED IEEE 802. Ill AUTHENTICATION SCHEME77 
AUTHENTICATE EAP-TLS 
A1 I 32 + size of IDc TLS-Start 0 
A2 32 + 384 + 20 Client Hello 28 
A3 128 + 128 + 2 + 384 + 32 Server Hello 28 
Server Cert � 1 5 0 0 
A4 128 + 128 + 32 Client Key Exchange 384 
Finished (Client) 32 
Finished (Server) 32 
T o t a l : � 1 5 0 0 T o t a l : �2 1 Q Q ~ 
Table 6.1: Comparison of packet payload size (in bytes) between the AUTHENTICATE 
protocol and EAP-TLS using 3072-bit RSA key exchange. The comparison is done in 
the way that both schemes have similar security level. For the data of EAP-TLS, only 
significant and mandatory payload fields are considered. Typical server's certificate is 
larger than 1500 bytes and client's certificate is not included. For our scheme, the data is 
based on the use of recommended ciphersuite. 
results show that EAP-TLS approximately requires half the number of mod-
ular multiplication of our protocol. It is expected that the speed of the 
AUTHENTICATE protocol is slower slower than that of EAP-TLS if the 
computations are executed in real-time. However, pre-computation can be 
applied in computing the commitments of the identification scheme and DH 
key exchange values so that the speed of our protocol is reduced to just 
lower than that of EAP-TLS. The RECONNECT protocol is much faster 
than EAP-TLS since it only involves hash evaluation and does not use any 
modular arithmetic. In summary, our scheme is competitive with EAP-TLS 
in view of computation speed. 
On the other hand, the lack of the use of bilinear mapping, which is 
always applied in other identity-based authentication and key exchange 
schemes ([56, 41，16] for example) allows our EAP method to have a much 
higher speed of computation than those schemes. Experiment results on 
comparison of RSA operations and bilinear mapping operations are shown 
in [8]. 
• End of chapter. 
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AUTHENTICATE EAP-TLS 
A1 2048 [0] 
A2 2304 [0] 
Key generation at server 256 
A3 1280 [1024] 
Key generation at client 256 Server cert verification 1024 
Server verification 3072 Secret encryption 3072 
A4 1024 
Client verification 3072 Client cert verification 1024 
Secret decryption 3072 
Tota l :13312 [8704] Total: 8192 
Table 6.2: A Rough comparison of total magnitude of exponents (in bits) between the 
AUTHENTICATE protocol and EAP-TLS using 3072-bit RSA key exchange. If pre-
computation is used, the values in the AUTHENTICATE protocol is reduced to that in 
[ ] .The comparison is done in the way that both schemes have similar security level. For 




This thesis has described a new upper layer authentication protocol running 
over the Extensible Authentication Protocol. It is suitable to deploy in the 
IEEE 802.IX framework, fulfilling the requirements on entity authentication 
and key establishment of the new IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN based security 
standard IEEE 802.Hi. The new EAP method is identity-based and avoids 
the use of PKI and certificates. 
Because of enhanced mobility and productivity, WLANs are experiencing 
a period of substantial growth in the marketplace, as described in Chapter 1. 
The physical aspect of data transmission in a WLAN is based on electro-
magnetic waves rather than conventional wires or optical fibers. This raise 
various security threats on confidentiality, integrity of data transmitted and 
authentication process which allows the WLAN to prove the identities of 
clients. In enterprise environment, where a WLAN usually operates in in-
frastructure mode, data is even more sensitive and thus a higher security-
level is demanded. The use of an authentication server to provide secure au-
thentication executions is an crucial step to protect the network. Another 
essential step is to provide encryption and data integrity to the sensitive com-
munication by using keys. Of course, adversaries will not forgo the chance 
to obtain benefits from compromising the network and communication, and 
therefore, they carry out different kinds of attacks on the authentication 
process and the keys. All of these background information are covered in 
Chapter 2. 
To secure WLANs, measures are specified in standards and implemented 
by vendors. Chapter 4 introduces conventional approaches to secure WLANs. 
Two significant methods are the use of VPN and WEP. VPN affects nega-
tively the bandwidth and computational performance. WEP, despite being 
a part of IEEE 802.11 standard, is threatened by different attacks. The con-
sequences range from successful message forgery, plaintext recovery to secret 
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key recovery. The entity authentication via shared key authentication which 
is based on WEP is totally useless when facing a replay attack. The Achilles 
heel is that the relationship between authentication and confidentiality in 
WEP allows an attacker to break one, get both. 
In order to remedy the weaknesses in WEP, a new security standard 
IEEE 802.Hi was released. Besides encryption and data integrity algo-
rithms, it provides authentication and session key derivation through the 
use of IEEE 802.IX and upper layer authentication protocols such as EAP-
TLS, as described in Chapter 5. Different ULA protocols can be adopted 
in different environments. For example, if backward compatibility is impor-
tant, LEAP can be used. If shared secret key is available, Kerberos is a 
good choice due to its efficiency. While EAP-TLS is the most popular ULA 
protocol, being a public key based protocol, it requires the use of PKI and 
certificates, suffering from performance drawback. 
When choosing an ULA for the RSN, while the public-key based ap-
proach is good for large enterprise due to its better key management, we 
have to solve the problems on bandwidth efficiency and computation speed 
because of the clients' need on frequent reconnect. Chapter 6 purposes an 
EAP method consisting of two protocols - the AUTHENTICATE and the 
RECONNECT protocol. They are secure against different kinds of attacks 
mentioned in Chapter 2. Using identity-based cryptography in AUTHEN-
TICATE can provide a better bandwidth efficiency and the symmetric-key 
based RECONNECT protocol fastens the computation speed as well. The 
basic cryptographic concepts and components used in the proposed authen-
tication scheme, such as key establishment, entity authentication, hash func-
tions, and Au and Wei's identity based identification scheme are introduced 
in Chapter 3. 
7.2 Future Work 
Possible future work lays on two areas. The first one is to implementing the 
proposed scheme, and to experiment on the performance of our schemes and 
other EAP methods and compare the results. The implementation involves 
three components - a client side software, a RADIUS server supporting the 
scheme and a PKG. The performance analysis in this thesis is performed by 
estimation and approximation and thus may not reflect the actual situation 
because practical implementation involves other factors affecting the perfor-
mance, such as upper layer header overhead and the choice on arithmetic 
algorithms. 
Another area worth exploring is the use of identity-based PKI [13] and 
hierarchical identity-based settings in the authentication, such as the one 
described in [27]. One disadvantage on the system settings of the proposed 
scheme is that, in a very large network, the private key generator would 
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have a quite burdensome job. The delegation feature can reduce some work 
of the PKG, but it does not provide a robust system organization and thus 
is only suitable for creating guest accounts. The use of identity-based PKI, 
on the one hand provides a systematic and standardized architecture to the 
system, and on the other hand avoids the use of certificates, overcoming the 
problems in conventional PKI. 
• End of chapter. 
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